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ABSTRACT
Intel has recently embarked on a mission to improve its supply chain responsiveness. Currently
production lead times are around 4 months requiring a forecast a quarter out. Most customer
demand changes happen within lead time since customers only know their demand a few weeks
before shipment. While stable production plans help maintain factory utilization rates their
inflexibility can also lead to missed revenue opportunities or unneeded inventory. The challenge
then is to make planning processes agile enough to react to late demand changes.
The FAB has a 2-3 month throughput time or latency. The subsequent Assembly-Test (ATM)
operation has a 1-2 month latency. Increasing competition requires the striking of a balance between
competitive service levels and excess inventory. This Thesis looks to develop ways of making more
real-time tactical demand updates to production plans used by the global factory network to improve
Supply Chain Responsiveness. Using business analytics and organizational processes analysis, ways
of making late demand changes to the production plan are evaluated.
The project focuses on Intel's global ATM network due to its proximity to end customer demand. A
holistic solution to use available intelligence is proposed. The focus is on creating data visibility
across the supply chain and on putting feedback loops in planning processes to intercept planning
processes at various points with new information as and when it becomes available. Issues examined
include demand signal generation, the choice of different demand signals, solver algorithms to
convert demand inputs to a global production plan, inventory target setting and implementation in
production plan and finally ATM processes such as SDD (delayed product differentiation at the
semi-finished goods warehouse) for Product Mix and volume determination. The hypothesis is that
this will lead to a better understanding of the interaction between various planning processes.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
FAB: Semiconductor Fabrication Plant
FSM: Fab-Sort-Manufacturing Intel term for a FAB.
ATM: Assembly Test and Manufacturing Plant
MMBP: Microprocessor Marketing and Business Planning, Intel Sales and Operations group
Judged Demand (JD): MMBP Forecast projected out 4 Quarters, by month, by forecast item
Billings: Previous, Weekly Data on what has been actually bought by and billed to Customers
Backlog (BL): Customer Projected Demand Forecast out over next 4 months on weekly basis
CPR: An internal Business Process Re-engineering effort
Customer Judged Forecast: Post-CPR Customer Projected weekly Forecast over next month
Commits: Intel Commit to Customer Order Request projected out weekly for next 4 months
Allocation: Post-CPR, Intel Commitment response to Customer Judged Forecast
Geos: World Wide Sales Geographies
Geo Forecast: Forecast by individual Geographies for their regions
COR: Weekly Change Order Requests by customers updating prior order Backlog estimates
Reset: Intel's monthly production planning process
OFG: Outside Factory Guidelines, an ATM capacity planning process
IFG: Inside Factory Guidelines, an ATM planning process following OFG for die distribution
Division Adjusted Demand (DAD): Aggregate signal used in OFG-IFG process.
SFGI: Semi-Finished Goods Inventory
SDD: SFGI Delayed Differentiation a Fusing based postponement process
ASRS: Automated Storage Retrieval System used for SFGI
CW: Component Warehouse, Intel terminology for Finished Goods Warehouse
ADI/TRDI: Available Die Inventory/Tape reel Die Inventory
VMI: Vendor Managed Inventory
WOI/DOI: Weeks of Inventory/Days of Inventory
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer
LOEM: Local OEM, Intel Term for smaller domestic OEM's
BOH: Beginning On Hand Inventory relative to planning cycle
EOH: Ending On Hand Inventory relative to planning cycle
Qx Weekly Schedule: Intel ATM Production Planning Schedule
STR: Storage Transfer Request, inter warehouse request
Roadmap: Quarterly or Yearly Product or Price Rollout strategy
EOL: End of Life of a product
NPI: New Product Introduction
WSPW: Wafer starts per week
DSS: Decision Support System, a tool for business analytics
1. INTRODUCTION
In the early era of the PC market, technology innovation and capability were the only things that
mattered. As the market has increasingly matured, with technology capability going a far ways to
meeting the needs of all but the heaviest workloads, customer service has become equally if not
more important as a key competitive differentiator. Increased competition has also meant that the
speed of technological innovation has increased rather than decreased in the battle for higher end
higher margin market share. It has also meant that the market has been segmented finely with an
array of products to fit every niche on the price-performance curve. Thus the industry has
increasingly become a high clock-speed industry requiring the servicing of a dizzying array of sku's
in an environment of higher demand volatility and competitive pressures.
The main challenge for Intel then has become increasing its customer responsiveness. Improving
customer service while reducing inventory is particularly tricky given heightened demand
uncertainty. To exacerbate this, the company along with the rest of the industry has a zero penalty
cancellation policy till the very last minute before order fulfillment. This means there is no great
incentive for customers to forecast accurately or improve forecast accuracy. The entire throughput
time for producing chips is around 3-4 months from wafer starts in the Fab and packaging in
Assembly Test operations through to stocking in finished goods warehouses. This means the ideal
heads up required from customers is 3-4 months before delivery. Given this, even if customers tried
their best to forecast well, it is arguable to what extent customers could accurately predict their
microprocessor requirements months ahead of end demand. Most demand only crystallizes in the
last few weeks before delivery so the real question is how does Intel become more responsive to
ever changing market demand, especially when the majority of the changes occur within lead times?
While there are many trends that become evident over the 3-4 month lead time from order forecast
how can it separate the noise from signal and respond only to meaningful signals? And once the
meaningful signals are identified analytically, what can be done within lead time to adjust the signal
such that demand is met, without building excess inventory.
The Intel Fab factory network is driven by a demand forecast called "Judged Demand" that is
published monthly while the Assembly Test factory network runs to fortnightly plans. Each month,
production volumes and product mix for various product families are re-allocated throughout Intel's
worldwide network of factories based on this forecast. However as discussed these planning
processes that are great for stability and capacity utilization are being buffeted by the need to
respond more real time to demand swings resulting from competitive pressures and their impact on
product pricing and strategies. These frequent and immediate changes have increased the need for a
system to make more frequent forecast updates with which to intercept various points in the supply
chain depending on where in the 3-4 month time line new and actionable information is available.
The ability to do this well to influence production would drive a more agile supply chain capable of
meeting improved customer service levels at leaner inventory levels with the ability to capture more
last minute customer upside or change requests all of which are top priorities for the company
today. Challenges in driving this change are equally technical and organizational.
This thesis evaluates opportunities for making late demand changes to the production plan using
business analytics and organizational process analysis. Some of the key issues are how demand and
inventory inputs for current production planning processes get decided. How are they
communicated across organizations? How is this tracked? What are the key incentives driving
behavior both within and outside the organization? What are the key barriers to making tactical
changes quickly and efficiently?
The current project focuses on suggesting ways of improving the supply chain responsiveness by
focusing on Intel's global ATM factory network due to its proximity to end customer demand. The
project consists of understanding all the production planning processes including demand signal
generation processes, the choice of different demand signals, solver algorithms to convert demand
inputs to a global production plan, inventory target setting and implementation in production plan
and finally ATM processes such as SDD (Semi Finished Goods Delayed Differentiation) and Range
Planning for Product Nhix and Volume determination. Initially approaches to improving demand
forecast accuracy were considered. But these approaches posed challenges to the project. Intel was
shifting to a VMI strategy (Vendor Managcd Inventory) as well as implementing a SAP on a large
scale for its supply-demand planning systems. As this was happening, the names of various demand
signals as well as their compositions were changing on a frequent basis. Hence any demand signal
accuracy analysis proved very difficult to do given the changing meanings of demand signals at
different points in time historically. In addition, due to the multitude of ongoing internal projects on
this topic as well as the fact that different forecasts were used at different points in the supply chain
making a single analysis less valuable, this approach was eventually discarded.
Intel is already pursuing various standard ways of improving responsiveness including reducing lead
times by increasing pipeline inventory (with VMI hubs), reducing forecast accuracy error (several
internal efforts strive to do this but there are limits to this) and increased frequency of planning
cycles (these cycles are costly, effort-intensive and there is an organizational limit to how often they
can be done). Hence this thesis explores other ways such as -
i) Increasing the number of production processes using pull rather than less accurate push forecasts
ii) Increased information transparency and decentralized decision-making
iii) Improved communication and standardizing for consistency
iv) Quicker learning rates based on micro-feedback loops
v) Improving bottlenecks such as scarce ASRS space at SDD a key push-pull interface and
information bottle-necks
vi) Improving clarity on ambiguous push-pull boundary with SDD and its shift in a post-VMI world.
The project has concentrated on identifying available intelligence about factors causing demand
changes and possible process interception points for delivering this information. The thesis explored
ways of making the intelligence actionable within the framework of existing planning processes. A
pilot project was conducted to demonstrate the concept and the results of this are explored in detail.
The criteria for success is longer term ROI of aligning supply with demand specifically attributable
to this project, helping to meet previously unmet demand changes as well as avoiding excess
inventory.
In addition to the process of making tactical updates, understanding how to communicate this
clearly and measuring the resulting ROI of these changes are also key considerations for the project.
Different demand signals used across different processes and the use of different types of product
groupings between supply and demand processes, with many-to-many mappings at each level, posed
the biggest challenges in meeting project objectives. What this means is that once a wafer level and
die-package combination level production plan is generated based on a marketing sku forecast, any
changes to respond to customer demand shifts require this complex translation. This makes any
swift communication almost impossible, while increasing reliance on solvers with embedded product
mappings for translation. The immense complexity this generates makes responsiveness a challenge
This project resulted in a better understanding of the interaction between various processes across
the chain, aided standardization efforts of inventory measurements which is used as a key tactical
control signal, improved product mix decisions to help grant late customer upside change order
requests and reduced costs related to excess inventory buildup. The project increased the ATM
revenue under the purview of SDD by up to 10% increasing the flexibility of Intel to respond to
changes in volatile demand. In addition a method of swapping demand based on trends in excess
finished goods inventory and semi-finished WIP (work in progress) related inventory bubbles was
developed. This method was projected to have an ROI of about 500K a year if implemented. Other
measurements suggested to capture the benefits will take longer to pinpoint, including improved
ROA on ATM assets such as ASRS, increased asset utilization by improved velocity as measured by
increased SFGI inventory turns, lower inventory costs through reduction in aged inventory at SFGI
and CW due to improved SDD process.
2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Intel is the world's largest maker of chips which in its case are primarily microprocessors and
chipsets for PC's but also include Flash memories, communications chips and embedded
controllers. The thesis primarily focuses on Intel Architecture based microprocessors which account
for more than 80% of its revenue.
The microprocessor business serves 3 main vertical customer segments- Desktop (computers),
Mobile (laptops) and Server (workstations). Intel sells the bulk of its chips through large OEM's
(Original Equipment Manufacturers) like HP and Dell who then sell to retailers like Best Buy etc. It
also sells its chips to ODM's (Original Design Manufacturers) like Quanta which make designs for
sale by OEM's. Lastly it sells chips through the distributor to increase its reach, with a network of
primary and secondary distributors, resellers etc. called the "channel" or "Disti". To most of the
above described customers it sells chips in bulk in what is called the "Tray " format. But it also sells
individual chips in individual boxes to retail customers through the channel in what is called the
"Box" format.
2.1. The Intel Supply Chain
Intel Supply Chain Overview:
The first and main part of the Intel supply chain is the FSM (FAB-Sort-Manufacturing) global
factory network. The semiconductor wafers are made here and they are diced and good chips are
sorted from the bad chips based on preliminary testing. These unpackaged good chips are called
"die". These available die are then shipped to a second set of factories called the ATM (Assembly-
Test-Manufacturing) factory network. Typically (but not always) the ATM's have a receiving
warehouse called the ADI (available die inventory). The ADI is used to store the sorted die shipped
from the FAB's. These die are then packaged and tested post-packaging in the A/T (Assembly-Test)
factories. The only step remaining to convert these chips into finished products is called the
"Finish" step. Since pre-Finish the chips haven't been completely processed, they are called SFGI
(Semi Finished Goods Inventory). The chips in the SFGI are stored in storage systems called ASRS
(automatic storage retrieval systems). The Finish process essentially is an electrical fuse blow process
that runs according to an algorithm or process called SDD (SFGI delayed differentiation). The
algorithm essentially makes a down binning decision such as rating a higher speed part as a lower
speed one (e.g. a 3 GHz part as a2GHz part etc.) or a part that can run at a lower power as one that
needs a higher power dissipation (e.g. a 40W part as 50W one). This is done to hard fuse what the
customer wants so that no black market can exist where parts with higher ratings are retested and
resold for more money. The SDD algorithm essentially has both Intel specified business process
guidelines as well as customer specified demand requirements that it tries to meet. When the parts
are Finished they are stored in Finished Goods warehouses called CW (component warehouses).
Strategic View:
The figure below shows a strategic view of the Intel supply chain i.e. a view showing the 14 strategic
decisions that need to be made at different locations in the chain. A decision on which wafer starts
to make and how many to make is required as an input to FSM. Within the FSM (and similarly in the
ATM) decisions on which WIP (work in progress) to prioritize are required. Since the FSM network
is located in a different set of global locations from the ATM factory network, a decision on where
to ship the different types of die coming out of FSM is required. At each of the inventory locations
such as the ADI, and later the SFGI, the CW and the VMI hub locations inventory decisions on
quantity and makeup of inventory as well as relative positioning of quantities across these locations
has to be made. At the input of the Finish step decisions have to be made on what to Finish and
how much to hold in SFGI. Lastly in the VMI Hubs, decisions on what to reserve for the OEM
customer to whom the hub is dedicated and what to share across the hubs is required.
Tactical View:
The tactical view of the Supply chain shows how the different supply-demand planning processes
interact with the supply chain to make the different strategic decisions required. The Build Plan
Reset process is used monthly at the start of each month to make the wafer starts and product mix
decisions. A Build Plan solver is used to make this decision. For ATM a two week build plan is
generated every two weeks through a twin process Intel calls OFG (outside Factory Guidelines) and
IFG (Inside Factory Guidelines). The OFG process is divided into OFG-Request and OFG
Response processes. The OFG Request is a production capacity request based on customer demand
made by Division Planners to ATM planners and assumes unlimited capacity. The ATM Planners
give a response back taking their capacity constraints into consideration. The IFG process is carried
out by Division planners and is essentially a reordering of granted product capacity to make the daily
production more in line time-wise with customer demand. The hotlist or CORS process is used to
factor in customer change order requests and is done weekly and affects OFG-IFG planning as well
as shipments from CW or VMI hubs.
The figures below show two views of the Intel supply chain- A strategic and a tactical view of the
supply chain. The strategic view of the Intel supply chain shows the key decisions being made in the
supply chain. The tactical view of the supply chain shows the actual supply-demand related
processes and where they intercept the supply chain.
Figure 2-1. Strategic View of Decision Making in the Intel Supply Chain:
1.-.
Figure 2-2. Tactical View of Demand Planning Processes in the Intel Supply Chain:
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Figure 2-3. Control View of Production Planning Processes:
Control View:
The above diagram represents the control system view of the Demand and Production Planning
processes in the Intel Supply chain. In the horizontal supply chain actual facilities are shown in solid
line and planning processes such as Build Plan Reset (using the build plan solver), OFG-IFG
(Outside Factory Guidelines and Inside Factory Guidelines which have their own OFG and IFG
Solvers) and SDD (SFGI Delayed Differentiation) are shown in dotted lines.
To understand the process and solvers used along with the feedback loops affecting the next cycle
or other processes, we proceed from left to right. The Wafer Starts are decided at the start of each
month in a process called the Reset using the Build Plan solver. This solver has as its input, the
forecasted Judged Demand from MMBP(a quarter out), the Inventory targets from MMBP both for
product mix and volume to be kept at different locations such as ADI and (CW+ SFGI), and the
beginning on hand inventory amounts from these locations. The BOH forms the feedback loop
from the last cycle of planning and stochastic demand pulls from CW and ADI. This then starts in
wafer starts for the FAB which will eventually after 3-4 months result in die sitting at ADI.
Every fortnight (beginning and middle of each month) the weekly plan for ATM's is done in a
process called OFG-IFG. While a simple description of this has been provided before a more
detailed discussion of this follows in the next section. Given that the ATM's typically have a frozen
period of about a month, this weekly plan typically results in a plan for 2 weeks of ATM builds a
month out (i.e. week 5 and 6). Note that while both Reset and OFG-IFG happen every month, the
horizon being affected for Reset is 3-4 month out given FAB lead times and for ATM's is a month
or so out given ATM lead times. Also the OFG-IFG process is broken into 3 solvers one for OFG
(capacity unconstrained but die constrained) request from Division planning to ATM planners, one
for capacity constrained Master ATM planner OFG Response to Division Planning and, finally, one
for IFG integrated solver to remix the time line for granted product requests. A thing to note is that
since the ATM demand is only a month or so out from true end customer demand; there are now
more signals that are available. They are the Customer (order on) Backlog signal, the Intel Commits
signal to customer and the Judged Demand(forecast for a month out).These are combined and
reconciled to create the demand and inventory signal for the OFG-IFG solvers. As with the Reset,
the BOH amounts from CW+SFGI cause results from last month's cycle to affect current month
cycle.
The SDD process or Algorithm which will be described in much more detail later is an algorithm
that runs the Finish operation to decide how to align push based starts from the ATM resulting in
SFGI inventory with customer demand based pulls from CW. This runs twice a day and helps
correct some of the forecast accuracy errors that result from the ATM starts being planned a month
and a half ahead of true customer demand pulls. The SDD algorithm looks at a composite of the
Backlog signals, Request for the Boxing group and VMI Hub demand measures such as STR
(Storage Transfer Requests) for demand pull and aligns it with a composite signal of ATM Qx
weekly scheduled starts and COR's (change order requests) from customers.
2.2. Sales Process
Customer Commits Process
The Intel Sales process is essentially an exercise in supply allocation after all demand has been
aggregated globally and across sales channels. Since a big part of the microprocessor market is
serviced by Intel, its supply situation as well as customer perceptions of its supply situation both
influence buyer decisions. The customer supply commitment process is designed to allocate
products that may be supply constrained such as top of the line products that typically are in short
supply when a new process is introduced. The allocation is designed to prevent gaming behavior and
ensure that all customers across geographies and channels get an equitable supply of products,
though it doesn't completely eliminate it. This means that customers have to project demand and
Intel has to project supply availability. A central organization called MMBP then has to match supply
with demand.
If supply outstrips demand every customer gets what they ordered. If demand outstrips supply then
MMBP has to make a judgment call based on customer and Intel forecasts of what each geography
and customer will probably end up requiring a quarter from now. This is because the factory
network has a 3-4 month lead time and current orders are essentially forecasts for what will be
needed a quarter out. Intel has a zero penalty order cancellation policy that customers enjoy till
essentially the very last minute. This means that if customers cancel orders, Intel is left with
unneeded inventory that it may have to take a charge for. Similarly if each sales geography thinks it
will grow faster than the expected worldwide growth then judgment is required at a global level.
Hence MMBP really focuses on making its own forecast (called Judged Demand) based on the
geography forecasts but with adjustments to reflect its own judgment as to how much delivery
customers and geographies will actually end up taking.
This judged demand is what is then allocated or "committed" to customers and geographies. These
commitments are the right to order products or "book" orders up to the committed amount. After
the few weeks to the booking deadline, the remaining commitments are redacted. Geographies do
have the right to ask for what's called "allocation" which is a certain amount not directly attributable
to a certain order but reserved for expected future orders. The Planning process through "Build Plan
Reset" then uses this Judged Demand to do production planning for deciding on wafer starts.
Hotlist or COR (Change Order Request) Process
Intel uses a process called the Hotlist or Change Order Request Process for responding to customer
demand changes after the regular forecast and planning process is over. This is the key way tactical
adjustments are made and as such is very important to understand for purposes of improving
customer responsiveness.
Cancelling orders or pushing them out in time is easy. Swapping order quantities from one product
line to another related one or pulling the order times in may or may not be easy to honor based on
product availability. The most common request is new requests for product called upside requests.
Again these require the most review and a statement of supply assurance. Typically customer field
sales communicate requests to their geographic business analysts (GBA) who try to meet requests
that they can and escalate the unfulfilled request to product supply planners (PSP) in Division
Planning. Product Supply Planners have more visibility into the pipeline globally and try to meet the
requests they can escalating unmet needs at a weekly Seance meeting with MMBP. Similar to the
concept of commits, granted hotlist requests can be underutilized and unused grants are pulled back
in. For more detailed discussion of these sales processes see Chow 2004.
2.3. Demand Planning and Determination of Wafer Starts
Judged Demand (D) is the key forecast published by MMBP which is used as the basis for deciding
how many wafers to start in the Fab. It is published monthly and used for determining wafer starts
through a process called "Build Plan Reset". It is a monthly breakout of projected demand for sku's
extending out 4 quarters out. The current quarter or first quarter is used by ATM for Test/Die
management and for deciding on inventory strategies. The second quarter projection is the key one
that is used for the wafer starts decision since the Fab throughput time is 3-4 months. The third and
fourth quarter projections are used for capacity planning and form the starting basis for the long
range planning group's work.
The end to end process for getting to a JD takes a little more than a month. The process is done
once for all the sku's across vertical business segments and typically involves hundreds of sku's per
vertical. Key inputs are obtained from customer sales projections from Geographic sales forces,
from macro-economic models, from billing trends and industry dynamics for all market participants,
from third party analysis and from various channel information.
While JD forms the basis for Demand inputs into the Wafer Starts determination process, Inventory
Strategy and Inputs are key to providing the necessary safety stock to support business and
operations strategy. These two sets of inputs by product family are then used in the Build Plan Reset
process to determine the Wafer starts and Mix needed for a quarter out demand.
Demand Planning
Process and Inputs
WW Forecast Inputs
Size Mix
:; ... Inventory
MW Strategy
LomomkContkif"Inventory
Targets
Geo Forecast Inputs
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5-6
Figure 2-4. Demand Planning Process and Inputs.
(courtesy: A. Reyner)
2.4 ATM Production Planning for Supply Assurance
OFG-IFG Overview:
The key Production planning processes used for ATM planning are the twin OFG-IFG processes.
OFG or Outside Factory Guidelines is a process where a capacity-unconstrained (but die-feasible)
demand request is made by Division Planners from the ATM planners. The ATM planners as
coordinated by the ATM Master Planner respond giving a yes, no or partial yes answer to the
request. This not only depends on their available manufacturing capacity but also on the BOM (or
Bill of Materials) and tool/facility availability such as for die prep. This response to the OFG
Request is called the OFG Response. A mix of manual planning and solvers are used for both these
processes. The other Process called the IFG or Inside Factory Guidelines then is carried out by
Division Planners with the agreement of ATM's where they rebalance the granted product mix and
volume across time to meet the actual demand linearity. The first chart below shows this high level
view of the OFG-IFG process.
The second chart below shows the simplified timeline for the OFG-IFG process. The OFG-IFG
process is carried out in the first and third week of the month and affects ATM builds post the
frozen horizon a month later for weeks 5 and 6 or 7 and 8 depending on the cycle.
Figure 2-5. OFG-IFG Overview
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Figure 2-6. OFG-IFG Timeline
OFG Request:
The OFG Request is Division Planning's communication to ATM on the build targets. The request
is unconstrained by ATM capacity but constrained by die availability. A key aim is to meet EOH
Inventory Target post projected demand while keeping tool utilization high. A combination of
manual effort and solvers is used.
OFG request typically matters only for the next two months though the farther out projections are
used for capacity planning. Also the actual build plan that matters is only a two week plan about a
month out after the frozen period of about 2-3 weeks to keep some level of predictability in the
factory. This does hurt responsiveness though and later on we will see some processes for affecting
change here. OFG-IFG cycle is done twice a month both at the start and middle of the month. The
demand signal used is some combination of available signals such as JD, customer commitments
and customer order backlog. The inventory targets are set by MMBP keeping die availability and
other yield parameters in mind.
OFG Response:
The OFG Response is ATM's communication to Division Panning on the best possible build
capacity for each product family requested given constraints of ATM tooling and die prep capacity
along with die availability. The key function of this step is to do a Site Split or Capacity allocation by
2 wks
Product and ATM Site. OFG response follows the same schedule for both planning cycles and for
build plans as the OFG request as it is essentially a yes or no response to the OFG request. A thing
to note in terms of the complexity is the mapping from demand to supply language. A single wafer
might have for example 20 ATM substrate names in OFG-IFG production supply planning which
might map to 50 sku's by marketing demand forecast families and these might eventually map to 100
SAP MM's (Material Master: SAP version of sku).
As far as the process goes ATM provides Division planning with OFG Response in an excel file
called the Databank wherein the figures in Databank are ATM's committed build plan for each
product. This response is given in weekly detail for the three quarter horizon, by wafer stepping,
package and additional levels of detail as needed to ensure capacity utilization. The OFG response
incorporates test capacity constraints, product prioritization & die/package availability at each ATM
site.
IFG Integrated Request & Response:
The IFG integrated Request Response Process uses an IFG solver algorithm that attempts to take
the granted capacity post OFG Request-Response and spreads requested builds out across time in
such a way that at any time the cumulative total requested builds covers the highest cumulative
demand from among a multitude of available demand and inventory signals (such as JD, Backlog
and Commits) including that week. As a result the demand and inventory signals in the IFG are
different than the one used in OFG. Given that all the capacity requested in OFG might not have
been granted the solver has built in intelligence to make both product priority calls. It tries to meet
demand on all products according to their priorities followed by their minimum requested inventory
followed by the requested Target inventory. Any additional products are assigned based on
discretion of planners.
3. RESPONSIVENESS
To be able to make Real-Time precision adjustments to world-wide chip production we need to
define the problem of improving supply chain responsiveness since production and production
planning form a control system with feedback loops that need to continually self-correct. This
chapter looks at what responsiveness entails and the most expedient ways of approaching this issue.
It ends by prescribing certain operative principles to guide policy actions and recommendations as
well as a pilot idea to test some of the ideas described herein.
3.1 Complexity and its Implications for Responsiveness
3.1.1 Types of Complexities:
The inherent complexities in the chip business are many and varied. They include the following
varieties all of which invariably reduce the ability to respond quickly because of the need to navigate
through the complexity before crafting a response-
1) Product Complexity - The number of sku's has increased tremendously both in response to the
increased competitiveness of the market as well as the proliferation of consumer electronic device
types that run on silicon today. This has added all sorts of complexity in terms of processing
variation to deal with different performance requirements, size and packaging variations to handle
different heat requirements, etc.
2) Complexities arising out of Customer Fragmentation: As the consumer section of the market has
gotten increasingly vibrant and comparable with the corporate segment the two segments with their
different needs and different demand volatilities have added pressure on demand forecasting and
responsiveness. This is seen in the widening OEM customer base and the widening spreads in their
forecast accuracies. In addition the globalization of this customer base and demand and the
increasing fraction of sales coming from newer emerging markets have also made this task harder.
3) Supply Chain Complexity: As the number of Intel facilities around the world have increased they
themselves have added to the supply chain and logistics complexity. In addition since these different
factories can make only certain types of technologies or products that makes it difficult to redo a
production plan once it has been created and disaggregated around the world to respond to
changing demand at the last minute.
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Figure 3-1. Supply Chain Complexity at Intel
3.1.2 Why Focus on ATM's for Improved Responsiveness:
The timeline for the entire delivery response from customer projection based JD to customer
delivery is very long on the order of 3-4 months and is shown below.
Wafer Starts to Customer Ship Time-line
JD based ATM Throughput TimeFAB Throughput Time OFG-IFG based
(Reset) from CW or VMI)
I i I
1 week 2-3 months 1 week 2-3 weeks
Note: Diagram not to scale
Figure 3-2. Timeline for Production Processes
While the JD projection based Wafer starts in the FAB to have the starting die for meeting customer
needs a quarter out is a necessity, the challenge is the forecast error is very poor when looking out a
quarter. After 3 months when the wafers are processed and the time for making an assembly and
test production plan through OFG-IFG nears the accuracy is greatly improved however there is still
some significant uncertainty surrounding final sku requirement and the demand only firms up in the
last week or so. The final postponed customization done to Semi-finished goods and called SDD for
SFGI delayed differentiation is only about a week or so away from Finished goods warehouse. The
forecast at this point currently has the best accuracy. This is shown in the chart below. Given this
the best point to focus on responsiveness is the ATM side rather than the FAB side. This includes
both the OFG-IFG production planning and processes in the last 2-3 weeks of delivery such as
SDD and ATM range planning, both of which are discussed in the next chapter.
Figure 3-3. Degradation of Forecast Accuracy with Time
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3.2 Approaches to Help Responsiveness
3.2.1 Identifying Opportunities
When trying to identify the opportunities for Responsiveness it becomes imperative that a high level
direction is set to help this. Two aspects of the direction are key. One is whether the approach
should focus on coordination while involving as many people in the chain as possible or whether it
should concentrate the decision making in the central planning group to prevent issues with strategy
coordination. The other issue is how decision making should be organized i.e. at what level should
decisions be made.
A) Approaches: Command and Control or "Wisdom of the Crowds":
While choosing an approach between centralized command and control and the "wisdom of the
crowds" it is worth remembering that it has to be implemented by various groups of people in
multiple globally dispersed organizations. It is difficult for centralized decision making to manage
globally dispersed supply chains where responsibility for handling different processes lies with
different organizations. So a key part of the chosen approach should be the ease of implementation
and the ease with which the recommendations can be effectively sold to help facilitate coordination
amongst the multitude of organizations. Since buy-in is so crucial to coordination and effective
execution of strategy, a more decentralized approach is advocated.
A second reason for this is provided by the market itself. External changes such as economic crises,
changing conditions in emerging markets, technological changes such as with atom, netbook, etc.,
are accelerating the industry clock speed. The current planning system works well when Intel's
actions are driving most of the changes but not fast enough when the changes are driving Intel to
act. Requiring all information flows to bubble up, pass through MMBP and then trickle down while
other organizations wait for a decision to be taken can create bottlenecks. Trying to avoid this
bottleneck increases the need for coordinated planning with more devolved decision making, clearer
communication and more visibility to information across the organizations.
A third reason is the nature of knowledge about the drivers of change. Knowledge is increasingly
disaggregated and local or product specific. Only in some cases does it make sense to bubble it to
the very top and wait for a decision. In most cases where speed is of the essence and knowledge is
perishable, trends provided by micro-feedback loops should be made actionable by individuals and
organizations closest to the process. E.g. SDD is handled almost entirely by Division planning with
very little information transmission. The key objective for MMBP then should be to make relevant
information visible to decision makers and set business processes or checks based on volumes or
product strategy to set trip wire or an "andon cord" calling for their attention.
B) Devolution of Decision Making: Close to the Top or the Bottom:
If we agree that an approach trying to use the distributed intelligence and knowledge in an
organization is preferred than the role of MMBP may evolve to the point where it -
i) collects information from every stakeholder (external and internal),
ii) sets operational objectives in line with its strategy,
iii) ensures that incentives, accountability and responsibilities are well defined, well aligned and well
understood,
iv) disseminates information making it visible to all(e.g. EOL, NPI, off roadmap moves in price,
strategic build-aheads),
v) does more coordination among organizations(Geographies, division planning, etc.) and finally
vi) leaves management of individual pieces e.g. inventory management past ADI to division planning
Hence reducing the center of gravity for decision making and devolving it to the lowest level
possible where it is as close to the actual entity in the field making the decision is preferable for
increasing supply chain responsiveness.
3.2.2 Decision Making Choices:
After speaking with members of the various planning groups across the world, various ideas for
improving responsiveness were explored and analyzed. Some of these ideas with their cost-benefit
analysis are described in the table below. There were 5 main types of ideas-
1) Making Intelligence Visible: Improving information visibility across all organizations to improve
the quality of decision making
2) Improving Communication: Since the setting of WOI targets is used across the board as a key
way of communication, making the WOI definitions consistent would help improve communication
tremendously. Inventory targets primarily provide directional information for the rest of the chain
and so consolidating the number of definitions helps communications without limiting flexibility.
3) Adding Micro-Feedback Loops: Since some of the feedback loops in the planning cycle are pretty
long, the goal would be to put in place shorter feedback loops to improve the rate of learning.
4) Improving ATM Planning Processes: Currently there is a lot of opportunity in improving ATM
planning processes such as OFG-IFG, SDD etc. since they are closer to the end customer demand
in time when the forecast accuracy is higher.
5) Reconciling different demand signals: Planners have many Demand signals to choose from
without a consistent business process on what to choose when they widely diverge. Giving guidance
here to reconcile the top spreads would help improve planning.
Figure 3-4. Possibilities for Improving Responsiveness
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It can be seen from the above that option 5 reconciling various signals is a significant effort on
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easier though still significantly useful. The other options are all impactful and though they
require some work to setup are easier than the demand signal work.
3.2.3 Decision Making Tree:
Given the above options it is worth putting a framework together to structure the options and
understand how they all fit together. The decision tree shown below provides a simple way to do
so dividing up the problem into three main parts -
1) Identifying and making changes in production plans to improve responsiveness
2) Communication these plan changes clearly and consistently across the supply chain
3) Measuring the effectiveness of these changes through some key performance indicators to
close the learning loop
A last but related part is the identification of a largely self-contained pilot effort to improve
responsiveness based on the above outlined options. In this case SDD has been chosen since it
is both self-contained and has some special features which magnify the improvements made
here.
The figure below shows a decision tree framework for thinking about the various options to
improve responsiveness broadly classifying them under the umbrella of making changes,
communicating changes and measuring changes. Each of these are separately described below-
Figure 3-7. Framework for Improving Real-Time Responsiveness :
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1) Making Changes:
The changes that can be made to improve responsiveness can be broadly classified as either general
changes or specific changes i.e. ones designed to correct for changes related to volume or product
mix. Of the 5 broad options listed before, all except the one on improving communication fall under
the category of making changes efficiently. While the 5 options are broad themes to keep in mind
while thinking of specific options, the responsiveness framework above lists the specific changes
and whether they affect volume or mix decisions or are general in nature. It is easier to think of Mix
decisions as either ones correcting for delivery in the next 4 weeks (mainly including SDD and ATM
Range Planning described in detail in the next chapter) or ones outside that period (and again here
we focus on ATM planning i.e. OFG-IFG).
ReAl-Tine
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The SDD related changes were used as the pilot and are described in detail in chapter 4. The idea for
the L1 level demand swaps between product families will also be described in more detail there. The
volume related changes include a suggestion to have a micro-feedback loop between an excess
inventory flag when raised at CW warehouse to the OFG-IFG planning process and solvers used
there. The solvers have an option to penalize builds on certain sku's and the excess inventory flag at
CW should be linked to the OFG_IFG solver as an excess inventory penalty flag. Currently excess
inventory flagged at CW is used to reduce wafer starts in JD. The link to OFG-IFG is not
formalized and relies on human communication to planners etc. The benefit of creating a feedback
loop to solvers is the formalization of the process.
Another area is changes that happen during price or product transitions. The key here is to create
visibility for ATM planners planning OFG-IFG , SDD etc. as well as making decisions on CW and
VMI hub stock levels into the transitions about to take place. Most product transitions such as EOL
and NPI are on the product plan (roadmap). But changes due to off roadmap transitions, or ones
that are trending to be faster or slower than earlier projected, as well all price transitions, are not
clearly visible to planners in the databases or solvers they use such as Qx weekly databases, OFG-
IFG solvers, SDD interface, etc. If directional guidance and visibility can be given on these
transitions without revealing sensitive price or margin information etc. then this could be of great
help in leveling the informational disparity and improving the quality of decision making. Finally
two broad and general improvement suggestions are to reduce either the number of sku's or the
number of product/price transitions if the cost of managing them is more than the incremental
profit contribution achieved by having them.
2) Communicating changes - Standardizing to communicate well
Making changes to improve responsiveness are not very effective if they can't be communicated
across a global supply chain clearly and without misinterpretation. The key way MMBP and other
planning groups try to communicate demand changes across the Intel supply chain are through
inventory targets specified as x WOI (weeks of inventory).There are two main types of issues that
have been identified by this project.
Issue 1-
The first issue is that inventory targets are set with a static view of the world e.g. MMBP might set a
goal such as 2 WOI need to be kept for a particular family or sku. Where 1 WOI maybe calculated
based on a projection of the next quarters demand projection/13 weeks. But the next quarter is a
fixed set of 13 weeks when targets are set. But in the solvers which division planners use the next 13
weeks are defined on a rolling basis so that when week 12 is being looked at the solver is looking at
the 13 weeks from week 12. This means that the solvers are doing something totally different than
how targets are set. But it gets even more challenging. For a division planner trying to implement
this goal in a dynamic (looking ahead on a rolling basis) OFG-IFG solver, they first need to have
week to week demand requirement filled out and the die or Test-out's coming in. Then they need to
iteratively populate the ATM builds to look at the resulting difference between outs and ins which is
the inventory level. If this in any week doesn't meet the inventory target, then they need to adjust
the optimization control flags in the solver which influences things like priority etc. iteratively to get
them the desired inventory answer by changing builds. In the process of doing this they have now
prevented the solver from optimizing builds.
One way around this is to have standardized business process guidelines on how solver flags are set,
for inventory target setters like MMBP to use the same demand signal as the Planners trying to
execute on their target with solvers and finally for the targets to be set by MMBP in the same way or
with the same solver interface as used by planners. Currently there is no standardized business
process for how solver flags are leading to wide variation, both planners and MMBP use different
sets of demand signals, and MMBP sets its targets using excel spreadsheets with different formulae
between different vertical groups, while planners use difficult to manipulate optimization solvers.
The result is that after a lot of iterations by planners either the MMBP targets are met at the expense
of optimizing production planning or production is optimized while MMBP targets are not met.
Constraining the optimizer to get the required sub-optimum answer in some cases requires up to
twice as much time for planning. Similarly based on the flag setting the resulting WOI (weeks of
inventory) can vary by up to a range of two (2x).
Issue 2-
If WOI is the main term used for communicating all important demand and inventory projections
and changes then it has to be totally unambiguous what it means i.e. what demand signal and in what
period is it referring to, over what period is the average taken to get to an average week requirement
projection and then how is the actual projection e.g. x WOI calculated. Unfortunately however this
is not standardized across the chain. In fact it gets very confusing as there are several definitions
used across the chain, and they all refer to not only different signals but also different time periods
for averaging etc. The definitions are shown listed below and have been referred to the inventory
team at Intel which has recognized this as a major issue and is working on standardizing it.
Figure 3-8. WOI Definition By Production Planning Process
Weeks Of Inventory (WOI) Definition Process
1 [1~13 (Next Qtr Demand )]/13 MMBP Corporate Target
2 [1113 (Next 13 weeks Demand)]/13 on weekly rolling FAB Div. Planning Wafer Starts FAB and ATM
basis Build Plan
3 [1 4 (Next 4 weeks ATM Plan)]/4 ,weekly rolling ATM BOM Request Solver
4 [114 (Next 4 weeks ATM BOM Plan )]/4 on weekly ATM BOM Request Solver WOI
rolling basis
5 [114 (Next 4 weeks ATM BP)]/4,weekly rolling ATM Capacity Plan Solver
6 {['y 1 4 or 1Z18 (D1 or D2)]/(14 or 18)} x (14 or 18) ATM Finish SDD Algorithm
7 [1Y4 (Next 4 weeks Orders)]/4 Excess Inv. Measurement
One of the key challenges faced in communicating tactical demand updates for precision
adjustments is that inventory measurement definitions are defined differently at different locations
based on the time frame and process. Understanding various processes and measurements to
standardize these prevents misinterpretation. As seen in the table above a major challenge is the use
of different Demand signals (Judged Demand, Backlog, Commits, OFG Adjusted Demand, IFG,
Division Adjusted Demand, etc.) Another issue is the use of different types of product groupings
between Supply and Demand Processes with many to many mapping at each level (e.g. Wafer types,
Stepping's, BOM, etc. for Supply and Sku's, Marketing Family, MM's, etc. for Demand)
3) Measuring the effectiveness of changes - closing feedback loops -
There are two kinds of system philosophies involving demand forecasting-
1) Systems which acknowledge there are limits to how accurate a forecast will be and have quick
feedback loops (as regards information on demand changes etc. that are important for planning etc.)
to course correct for demand changes improving accuracy by increasing responsiveness and
2) Systems based on the belief that the best way to improve responsiveness is to primarily focus on
improving the accuracy of the forecast.
The primary focus of the improvement suggestions here has been the effort to improve feedback
loops for two reasons -
1) There is a significant amount of work being done in the area of improving forecast accuracy,
while not enough has been done on the area of improving feedback loops
2) In a model of distributed decision making the best way to improve the quality of decisions is to
improve information visibility (Lee, October 04) through a system of interlocking feedback loops.
A key area of improvement here is the feedback regarding how well the system is doing i.e. some
metrics to measure the quality of forecasting, build algorithms, decision making etc. As shown in the
responsiveness framework, these can again be sub-divided into mix, volume and standardization
related metrics. To assess mix improvement achieved through the SDD Pilot improvements, the
inventory turns in SFGI and the increased numbers of upside change order requests after a change is
made are key metrics to look at. To assess volume improvements reductions in excess inventory and
the number of demand swaps from one sku to another (explained in next chapter) pro-actively
implemented can be used. For work standardization efforts the reduction in the number of WOI
definitions in use across the chain as well as the fluctuations in demand or inventory quantity being
planned (caused purely as an artifact of the planning software or process or interpretation of signal
being used) can be used.
4) Identifying a pilot
The best pilot location in the supply chain is in the SDD SFGI Delayed differentiation location. The
main reasons for this are as follows-
1) The entire operation is self contained within a single group in terms of planning and execution.
2) SDD currently is the main push-pull interface as far as production planning goes. The OFG-IFG
process based ATM plan is the push based production plan under which the SFGI goods are made
and stored in the ASRS (Automatic Storage Retrieval System) space. From here only the volume and
mix requested in the immediate few weeks by customers, as evident through CW (Component or
Finished Goods warehouse) depletion, are finally finished for shipping and delivery.
3) The SDD business process guidelines are unclear resulting in inconsistent usage across products.
So this location offers the most promise of improvement in responsiveness.
4) This location being the last process before customer shipments through CW or VMI etc., the
forecast accuracy is highest here.
Given these reasons the next chapter describes in detail the actual pilot process and its results.
3.3 Harnessing Business Intelligence to improve Responsiveness
3.3.1 Types of Business Intelligence: Both New and Already Available
There are many different types of business intelligence which following the general approaches
outlined above can be used to improve responsiveness and make precision real-time adjustment.
They are discussed below under the categories in which they fall
1) Intelligence visibility:
- Since so much of the supply chain volatility is caused due to the price/ product transitions that
happen frequently, flagging them across planning databases for visibility across the chain while
addressing the confidentiality issues is a key lever for responsiveness improvement.
- Having visibility into the orders on record to judge their quality and likelihood of materializing
may also be useful for prioritization purposes. Examples of this are the amount of customer
backlog which is on hold due to reasons such as customers failing certain checks, to the portion
of demand forecast that is projected upside rather than actual demand.
- Making planners who accept change order requests aware of the ability to prioritize orders, even
inside the ATM frozen period through SDD and range planning, is very useful.
2) WOI Alignment:
- Standardizing WOI definitions will help communication across the chain
- Setting WOI targets on a rolling basis weekly just like in optimization solvers helps align target
setting with the solvers used to execute on these targets.
3) Micro-feedback Loops:
- Often an inertial time lag is seen in information flow in planning processes, where even after
receiving new information (e.g. An excess inventory signal at CW) nothing happens (e.g. WIP is
processed the same way at ATM's) till the next planning cycle comes through. Efforts to have
more frequent planning cycles are worthwhile. Given a certain cycle, faster transfers of this
information to all the intermediate upstream interception points even before the main planning
decision point can make use of this information to do things differently. This can improve
agility, coordination and the rate of dissemination of information or learning substantially at a
fraction of the effort of an additional planning cycle e.g. using a trend to reset WSPW takes
several months to take effect, using it to affect OFG-IFG takes up to a month, while using it to
affect ATM range planning takes less than a week and for SDD takes less than a day.
- The loop wherein feedback from price transitions affecting demand trends to price setters needs
to be sped up for more nimble action on discounts etc. Similarly Product Transition trends are
very disruptive when EOL products linger on longer or NPI products fail to swap more demand
off older products sooner. Providing clearer feedback on this to both planners and
pricing/branding groups helps respond sooner on changing forecasts and builds.
- Other signals that could be exploited for projecting sooner than anticipated EOL are when
customer order commitments fall below projected demand, or when there is available inventory
for upside requests but it isn't being used up.
- Tying in the Excess Inventory report outs at CW to set flags such as Excess Inventory Penalty,
maximum inventory for underweighting certain builds in OFG, or increasing set aside quantities
through ADI Minimum Flags can also be effective. Similar are the SDD and range planning
statistics to set OFG flags.
4) Improving ATM Planning Processes
- Having a Sku Level acceptance list for deciding whether to allow ATM's to pull-in next week's
production plan to this week for lot size or capacity utilization can be helpful.
- Using weekly linearity or breakout of demand in forecasts such as JD, Geo Demand etc. may
prevent the misuse of assuming an equal breakout across weeks of monthly forecasts.
- Providing confidence bands or variability on forecasts which is currently done via WOI target
adjustments to the up or down side would help planners downstream
- Adding a global solve step for the individual solves done by planners helps to really put extra
inventory builds where needed for proper optimization
5) Reconciling various demand signals
- One of the biggest problems facing ATM planner's down-stream is what to do when the
multiple signals that they have access to (such as commits, backlog, JD, Geo Demand, etc.)
diverge vastly. They typically will act conservatively choosing the largest amount for every sku.
This would be greatly improved by either having a signal (a planning andon) bringing different
forecasters and planners together when things diverge by a certain percentage, or by having a pre
OFG-IFG step for reconciliation of top 5 or top 10 biggest divergences.
- Similar reconciliation in cases of overbooking for the 0-4 week tactical horizon or when sales
forces still have large amounts of demand on supply reservation without having an assigned and
ready customer will be useful.
3.3.2 Delivering Intelligence
1) Aggregating Intelligence:
Once the intelligence identified above is obtained, the format in which it is delivered is important.
Whether it is an information packet or visible right through various planning databases such as Qx
weekly in the case of ATM planning, for example, is a key choice. Another issue is to prevent
unsophisticated users of this information from misinterpreting the information. A product
identified for EOL may not be transitioning as fast as another product similarly identified. How
guidance or extra commentary is provided when providing broad access to information or
intelligence is therefore a key issue. In addition, aggregating the intelligence can take multiple forms
depending on what type of actions one wants the user to take. Conceivably a combination of all the
intelligence can lead to an adjusted signal or, through an algorithm or business process guideline,
lead to the making of certain decisions. A range can also be a useful way of communicating
intelligence where different types of information either increase or decrease confidence bounds on
a given range or change the range around the forecast itself.
2) Integrating Intelligence with Production Planning Processes:
In each of the above described cases the planning professional can make or alter certain planning
decisions as and when new intelligence is available. This requires the close alignment of intelligence
in a way that is actionable to the regularly scheduled production planning process. As such to
integrate intelligence delivery seamlessly with planning processes the following considerations
should be looked at -
* Delivery location - SDD, ATM Range Planning, OFG-IFG, ATM Planning
* Type of intelligence from list described in section 3.3
* A choice of strategic product categories - NPI/EOL products, High Volume parts, High Price
or most Price volatile parts etc.
* Type of Decision being influenced
3.4 Case Study: Using Intelligence to set Responsiveness Improvement Strategy:
The previous sections have discussed broadly the types of strategies useful for improving
responsiveness, as well as the types of business intelligence available for use with these strategies.
This section discusses a case study trying to use a specific type of business intelligence for drawing
insights into actions that would help improve responsiveness.
The numbers used here are normalized to disguise them. The analysis used a sample month and a
certain statistically significant set of sku's in a product category. The signals used were both "push"
based obtained from production planning and "pull" based obtained from an effort to replenish
inventory depletion caused by customer ordering. Four main insights for the direction
responsiveness improvement efforts should take result:
1) Push vs. Pull:
A Push based system is a made to forecast system while a Pull based system is a made to order
system. Demand signals can be forecast based or Push based using this terminology. Or they can be
demand signals generated based on customer ordering and in that sense be Pull based. The reason
why the Pull signal still has an error is that the customer demand typically changes up to the very
end due to the zero penalty cancellation policy that Intel has. The 2 charts below show both for 2
weeks and for 4 weeks, error distributions related to 2 signals denoting cumulative demand: a
"push" based signal called commits denoted by CMT and a "pull" based signal called backlog
denoted by BAB for a certain sample number of sku's over a sample month. The X axis denotes a
normalized measure of absolute percentage error i.e. Magnitude of Error and the Y axis denotes the
number of data points in each of the Error buckets. So in chart1 for example there are about 60
sku's for which the CMT signal had an error of about 500 on an logarithmic error scale, while there
were only 30 sku's with error in that range for the BAB signal.
The absolute percentage error is calculated by comparing the demand signals with "true" demand as
measured by actual sales. The charts show the frequency distribution of data points or sku's falling
in each error bucket. Regardless of whether it is 2 or 4 weeks, the "push" signal is worse than the
"pull" signal when it comes to forecast accuracy, suggesting that to improve "responsiveness", the
"pull" signal should be used to the extent possible for production planning.
Figure 3-9. Push vs. Pull Signal Comparison at 4 weeks
Note: All numbers are representative but disguised
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Figure 3-10. Push vs. Pull Signal Comparison at 2 weeks
Note: All numbers are representative but disguised
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2) Cumulative 2 week vs. Cumulative 4 week Demand Signal:
Note: All numbers are representative but disguised
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Figure 3-11. Cumulative 2 week vs. 4 week signal Comparison for BAB
The above chart shows that forecast error for a given "pull" based signal, called "BAB" in this case,
the cumulative 2 week forecast errors are typically smaller than the cumulative 4 week errors.
Currently 4 or 8 week forecasts are done in OFG-IFG for ATM planning. So while in the case of
FABs this might not be possible given the 3-4 month long lead time, if ATM Production throughput
time and OFG-IFG production planning time can be improved below a certain critical point, then
using 2 week customer pull as the demand signal instead of a 4 or longer week "push" signal would
improve accuracy and customer responsiveness. Note that the averaging of forecast errors over a
longer period is more than dwarfed by the significant inaccuracy due to a lack of visibility in
forecasting.
3) Level of Forecasting Granularity for Production Planning:
Note: All numbers are representative but disguised
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Figure 3-12. Cumulative 2 week vs. 4 week signal Comparison for JD
The above chart shows that forecast error for a given "push" based signal, called "JD" in this case,
the cumulative 2 week forecast errors are not (statistically significantly) necessarily smaller than the
cumulative 4 week errors. This is interesting given the result in the previous bullet. The reason for
this is that the JD signal is predicted on a monthly basis and then using a linear "4-4-5" weekly
schedule per quarter it is broken into a linear weekly forecast(even though it is known that the
demand is not evenly distributed). Due to this artifact the accuracy advantages of forecasting and
planning 2 weeks ahead vs. 4 weeks ahead (see description for point 2 on previous page) is lost. This
demonstrates the importance of forecasting at a granularity that is consistent with the production
plan being developed. A monthly JD forecast may be suitable for the monthly wafer starts plan but
is not suitable for use in the ATM production plan which is used with a weekly granularity. In
addition there are several well known phenomena causing non linear demand distribution across the
weeks such as efforts to meet end of the month or end of quarter sales quotas, typical price changes
in 4 th week of Quarter, product and price transitions on products at end of quarter etc. In all these
cases accuracy and responsiveness decreases when trying to artificially force fit a monthly forecast
into a weekly plan.
4) Judged vs. Unjudged Signals in the Tactical Horizon (Near Term Horizon):
Note: All numbers are representative but disguised
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Figure 3-13. Judges vs. Unjudged signal Comparison in Near Term Tactical Horizon
The above chart shows 2 signals an "Unjudged" or relatively unadjusted signal from the customer
through sales called "GD" and a "Judged" or adjusted version of that signal using business
intelligence about supply constraints and past order patterns. The interesting thing to note is that the
Judged signal is arguably worse or at best no better than the Unjudged signal despite significant
effort at trying to improve on the customer signal. This suggests that while forecasting a few months
out forecasting judgment maybe necessary to correct for optimism and bias, over the next few
weeks, the accuracy and visibility is high enough that efforts at judging might only succeed in
introducing more error.
4. SDD
4.1 SDD Process Overview
SDD or SFGI Delayed Differentiation is Intel's Postponement Strategy for the Final Finishing
Operation. Final product characteristics like Speed and Power rating can be fused (blowing a fuse)
to one of many values by down-binning the part. Current production relies on Push based ATM
starts to SFGI and End Customer Demand based Pulls from SFGI. SDD is the critical Push-Pull
interface process in the Supply Chain located at SFGI. The section below explains the problems that
give rise to the need for SDD as well as what the SDD process entails. The sections after that
describe the pilot that was carried out at SDD to improve responsiveness and the results of that
pilot.
4.1.1 Why SDD
The ATM Factory currently builds to a push based Build Plan based on the OFG/IFG process. In
the absence of any postponement strategy, the final MM or L1 level sku is completed through the
Finish process based on a 4-8 week old forecasted demand. As previously discussed the forecast
accuracy significantly improves as the final delivery date from CW approaches. This is because there
is a no penalty order cancellation policy and the customers change the composition and volume of
orders substantially as they have more visibility into what the end customer desires. Inherently
higher uncertainty over a longer duration causes higher demand variance but there are also other
reasons. Since there are more steps and players involved over a longer duration versus a shorter
duration, the bullwhip effect is inherently higher over a longer duration.
The customer order on backlog fluctuates daily till the very last day resulting in significant
mismatches between what was made based on OFG-IFG versus what is actually needed leading
either to shortages or excess inventory held at CW at the sku level. This leads to both lost upside
opportunities and higher costs from obsolescence and holding of unneeded inventory. A large
portion of the unmet opportunity is actually within the same product family and differs only from
what was made in the final Finish step. As such postponing the final Finish or Fusing decision to the
very last minute and basing it on a day to day Pull Signal based on customer backlog makes a lot of
sense to get the right mix and volume. This is what SDD or SFGI delayed differentiation does. It
allows the ATM to build needed mix and volume of products based on latest customer backlog.
4.1.2 SDD Business Process
The SDD algorithm bases the Finish or fusing decision on real time CW supply and demand, also
called customer Backlog. The decision on what and how much to make is based on an SDD
algorithm run each shift. It remixes the current week builds within fuseable families to where need is
as constrained by the product family levels being built in the build plan (called Qx weekly schedule).
Normally production change decisions in the current week and next week are off-limits to planners
to avoid ATM manufacturing from being whipsawed. This 2 week period is called the Frozen
Horizon. But with SDD the planners can actually submit same week demand swaps (at L1 level)
based on the mismatch between current customer backlog and the OFG-IFG based Build Plan for
fungible sku's (i.e. sku's within same product family that only differ in the final finish step). The
diagram below shows the relative locations of the SFGI inventory that is stored in a space called
ASRS (Automatic Storage Retrieval System). The SFGI is at the end of the ATM and feeds the final
Finish step before the finished goods are sent to the CW warehouse.
Figure 4-1. SDD in the Supply Chain
Option to hold inventory here to fuse as backlog accumulates
4.1.3 Where SDD Fits in the Frozen Horizon
The figure below shows how SDD relates to OFG-IFG as well as to the other process in the
Frozen Horizon viz. ATM Range Planning. The current week and the next week are frozen from a
ATM build plan change perspective. Within this frozen horizon SDD dictates current week
production and any build plan changes have to be limited to Finish or Fusing related changes called
L1 swaps within the same L3 level Product family. The ATM production for next week can be
changed via a process called ATM Range Planning. While we won't go into the details of this
process, the Range planning effort allows factories to make more or less (at the L3 or product family
level) than the OFG-IFG plan based on a calculation that determines whether there is more or less
demand now as compared to when the plan was made. Beyond the frozen horizon the production
plan of record is still the one based on previous OFG-IFG cycles. So in essence SDD and Range
Planning are the only two POR (plan of record) processes that can be used to make production plan
changes within the frozen horizon and their relation to each other and OFG-IFG is shown below..
Figure 4-2. SDD in the Frozen Horizon
wwO Frozen Period
S.Frozen Period
VV1 Range
4.2 SDD Pilot Overview
4.2.1 Pilot Concept
The figure below shows the concept of the SDD Pilot. A bubble refers to an inventory buildup at
either CW or SFGI. A swap refers to a demand swap which is primarily a shift in requested
production i.e. a shift in demand from one sku to another. Currently the response of ATM Planning
processes to change in demand is very slow. As described before SDD is a critical Push-Pull point in
the chain where the forecast-based OFG-IFG push demand meets the customer driven pull as
measured by same week customer backlog as well as CW and VMI depletion. The pilot tries to
outline what can be done at the SDD point to improve responsiveness while remaining without
broadly changing the main OFG-IFG process. In the last chapter on recommendations, the ideal
improvement step is outlined which would require bigger structural changes in OFG-IFG.
Figure 4-3. SDD Pilot Overview
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The Responsiveness Pilot is based on 2 main concepts -
1) Facilitate better bubbling up of customer Pull vs. IFG Push mismatches through earlier/clearer
inventory bubbles- Appropriate ASRS(SFGI) allocation is used to address this
2) Facilitate balancing out these bubbles through pro-active Demand Swaps- Make bubbles visible
and encourage Division Planning to dynamically rebalance through swaps to address this
When SDD capacity isn't allocated right it results in a high rate of Flush or Push based (on 1-2
month old OFG-IFG based Demand forecast) Starts into CW. This results in 2 main issues:
1) Fewer Inventory Bubbles or buildup of unneeded Sku's in SFGI (ASRS space)-
SFGI Inventory Bubble build up is the signal to Division Planners of unexpected demand shifts.
An unclear Pull signal prevents demand swap action from unwanted sku's to wanted sku's. This
reduces possibility of upside grants of customer change requests and helps add to excess inventory
2)High Flushes resulting in Risk Finish decisions and builds into CW off months old Forecast Plan
This adds to unneeded inventory. It's a bigger issue in case of transitions like EOL, Price transitions
etc. where inventory may not be able to be sold. Currently risk decisions are not prioritized for
Profit margin increasing the cost of the risk taken.
The figure above shows the 3 main inventory locations influencing SDD i.e. TRDI(or ADI), SFGI
and CW. Currently an excess inventory flag is raised when an inventory bubble starts building up at
CW above a certain range around 2-6 weeks for a sku. However as this information is conveyed to
the OFG-IFG process and there is still another 4-6 weeks of inventory in the pipeline from TRDI
to CW, this is too late and the inventory bubble keeps building up. The execution of the decision to
stop building CW inventory in other words lags by about 4-6 weeks.
The figure above conceptually describes what the pilot aspires to do to reduce this time lag in the
prevention of unnecessary inventory buildup. The problem is attacked in two parts -
PART 1: Moving the inventory bubble from CW to SFGI-
The idea here is to move the bubble buildup to an earlier point where something can be done about
it. At CW it is too late to change the inventory configuration since it has already been finished into a
final configuration. If this not needed nothing can be done about it. But had the bubble been
building up at SFGI it provides ample opportunity to configure or Finish only what is actually
needed and store the remaining parts at SFGI in a space called ASRS space (automatic storage and
retrieval system).
How can the bubble buildup at CW be moved to SFGI. To understand this we need to understand
the reason why it builds up at CW instead of SFGI. Two main reasons were identified for this.
i) The available ASRS space is limited and improperly allocated across product families(sku's)-
As a result once parts have been started in ATM, even if an excess inventory flag goes up at CW,
once the limited ASRS space fills up for SFGI, it is finished and ends up increasing the CW
inventory bubble. While the overall ASRS space in ATM's is very limited and increase in this space is
a key recommendation in chapter 6, due to capital considerations, we assume this is a longer term
solution to be worked on. So given the ASRS space constraints, the next best thing that can be done
is to ensure that ASRS space allocation between product families is properly done. A new capacity
allocation algorithm helped reduce the allocation mismatches of this key ASRS resource and is
described later on
ii) The business process and decision making determining the SFGI-CW split is not optimum-
Even if there is enough ASRS space allocated to a product family and it can be kept at SFGI when
unneeded at CW, if the SFGI-CW split for inventory positioning is wrongly set, the CW bubble will
grow e.g. 0 at SFGI and 7 DOI (days of inventory) at CW, the SDD process will end up finishing
and putting 7 DOI at CW adding to the inventory bubble at CW. To address this the pilot proposes
a way to properly allocate the SFGI-CW Split
iii) Dynamically changing ASRS allocation to allow large bubbles to build-
As part of the effort to allocate ASRS space efficiently to allow large bubbles to build up at the
SFGI side instead of having to a flush of parts due to a lack of space, we recommend dynamically
changing ASRS allocations on daily or weekly basis. This wasn't tested in the pilot as it will require
further development work. This is a worthwhile pending further IT development..
iv) Using SFGI Bubble Feedback to change demand plan in OFG-IFG-
Currently the excess inventory flag once raised is used to alter demand decisions at OFG-IFG.
However buildup trends in SFGI are not looked at since the space is so small that most of the
bubbles buildup in CW. However once the ASRS allocation issue is fixed, SDD needs to send
feedback to OFG-IFG about SFGI bubbles to affect demand swaps
PART 2: Pro-actively leveling the inventory bubble at SFGI-
Once SDD capacity is allocated correctly based on discussions in part 1 above and flushes are
reduced to a minimum, then much clearer and earlier inventory bubbles should start primarily being
57
detected at SFGI. If no pro-active demand swaps are done, or they are done only on receiving
upside change order requests( as happens now), then, the Pull information in SFGI inventory
bubbles, which is an early warning system to change OFG-IFG builds, is being ignored for another
cycle or two. Hence a Pro-active demand swap policy is needed to prevent unneeded inventory by
leveling the production plan. There are two ways suggested for this in the pilot -
i) Pro-actively swapping demand from one sku to another within same fungible family-
A large portion of demand variations happen from one sku to another for the same fungible item.
A fungible item or L3 level is defined as the semi-finished goods form of a sku sitting at SFGI,
where it can be converted into several different sku's (called L1 level items) by SDD. In this case
when inventory bubble starts building up on one sku in SFGI, demand trends and other information
on other sku's within the same fungible family are used to make a L1 demand swap decision from
one sku to another for the same L3 item. While in some cases there will actually be more demand on
another sku than planned for requiring this swap, often there will be adequate production planned
for other sku's, requiring a risk decision for pro-active demand swapping based on trends in demand
rather than actual demand.
ii) Using Pro-active L1 Swap Feedback to OFG-IFG to swap demand-
Along with using the SFGI bubbles to change OFG-IFG demand plan, trends in pro-active L1
swaps must be used to as an additional data point to modify demand decisions at OFG-IFG.
4.2.2 Description of Key Algorithms
1) ASRS Allocation Algorithm-
Currently ASRS Allocation is based roughly on Projected Product Volume. ASRS Allocation. The
new proposed algorithm is based on Relative Ranking using Price, Volume, Variance & Fungibility.
Items that have higher value are valued more by this algorithm as evidenced by a higher score since:
i) The higher the price the higher the value of a item.
ii) The greater the volume sales of a sku the greater the profit contribution of a SKU.
iii) Highly fungible skus are more valuable as they can utilize SDD to a greater degree because they
can be fused to form many different SKU's.
iv) Items with higher variance have higher value as finishing them peremptorily increases the unsold
inventory risk.
The higher the score the higher the SFGI allocation percentage or ASRS space. The more this space,
the more of these products are finished only when needed.
1) Product Volume- The Pilot used average weekly volume over last 2 weeks of Billings with a
proposal to eventually migrate to last 2 weeks of Customer Commits when this can be setup.
2) Product Price- Since Price is significantly higher than cost and cost data is difficult to get at the
sku level, the algorithm uses Price as a proxy for Profit Margin. This is currently set quarterly and is
based primarily on listed (CAP) Price.
3) Demand Variance- The pilot currently looks at demand variance over last 4 weeks of customer
Billings or sales. We then rank top, middle and bottom third of product family variances giving
variance score of 1,2 or 3.
4) Product Fungibility- Use (L3) Higher Level Fungible Item to (L1) Sku level Fungibility to get
mean Product Fungibility. We rank top, middle and bottom third, giving a score of 1,2 or 3
Final Allocation Score for each sku = (Volume x Price x Variance Score x Fungibility Score). The
Relative Allocation Rank = (Volume x Price x Variance Score x Fungibility Score)/(Z Allocation
scores for all products). Relative Ranks are calculated for all products per site. If ASRS capacity per
ATM site is C above, Relative Allocation per Product in a site = C x Relative Product rank. A
theoretically developed allocation model is described in the appendix at the end. The key difference
in this model is that the ASRS allocation in the theoretical model is inversely proportional to the
variance. We recommend eventually moving to this formula. During the project due to the large
numbers of SKU's with a rapidly changing mix, several practical issues related to IT and data
integrity in getting reliable variance numbers, the heuristic allocation approach described in the
previous section was used. Simplifications used to generate the variance rankings is described next
along with the Fungibility rankings. But eventually once the variance calculations can be quickly and
reliably calculated, implementation and validation on the suggested theoretical formula might be
carried out.
While the volume and Prices are straightforward, the Variance score and the Fungibility score are
calculated as shown below -
Variance Score- Atypical Product Family contains many sku's (L1 level ).The variance score for the
family is calculated as described above. A typical score calculation is shown below. For all the sku's
in a family, demand variance for the last 4 weeks is calculated. For simplification it also assumes zero
correlation among sku's in product family so that Variance of E sku's in product = E Variance of
sku's. Once the scores for each family are there we just rank them in three equal size groups for low,
medium and high variance with scores of 1,2 or 3 respectively
Figure 4-4. Variance Score Table
1 6.576 7.748 7.817 8.384 0.57610625
2 11.657 12.576 15.047 11.45 2.724303
3 0.776 0.878 0.818 0.479 0.03150825
4 12.474 20.805 18.612 15.528 13.21454625
5 11.314 11.842 11.319 13.726 1.30943225
6 0.911 0.135 0.376 -0.012 0.164213667
7 15.736 21.084 35.259 19.821 72.274458
8 11.241 20.671 16.173 12.559 17.84034933
9 1.304 0.85 0.585 0.828 0.089950917
10 20.844 35.597 25.312 24.404 40.18138092
11 0.292 0.475 0.818 1.31 0.200285583
12 6.147 11.743 8.964 12.03 7.58883
13 -0.009 0.342 0.009 0.164 0.026671
14 0.065 0.11 0.318 0.147 0.012219333
15 0.326 1.726 0.507 1.874 0.647134917
16 1.689 2.8 2.696 1.968 0.296602917
17 13.243 12.143 10.007 5.897 10.509377
18 0.175 0.365 0.05 0.217 0.016875583
Assuming skus are uncorrelated variance o f sum (P rod uct) Product
=sum of variances of skus Varianc. 167..7042452
Fungibility Score- The table below shows a calculation of a Fungibility rank for a Product family. A
product family can have several L3 level Fungible items. This means each fungible item can be
finished into many different sku's by SDD. These are listed vertically below from 1 to 40. Each L3
level can be converted into several sku's or L1 level items . These L1 levels are shown horizontally
below from 1 to 19. A "1" in the matrix means that for that particular horizontal L3 level item it can
be converted to that vertical L1 level sku. For example in the first row that L3 Level item at SFGI
can be converted to 11 different sku's in CW. Since a product family as shown below has many
different L3 items (40 in this case), each of which has a different amount of Fungibility or flexibility
to be converted into different sku's (e.g. the first L3 item here can be converted to 1 skus but the
next one can only be converted into 10 sku's) , we need to find a product family level Fungibility
score. We do this summing up the total Fungibility(167 in this case)and calculating an average L3
level Fungibility to normalize for different number ofL3 items in different product families(167/40
=4.175). Once we get this score for all product families we just rank them in three equal size groups
for low, medium and high Fungibility with scores of 1,2 or 3 respectively.
Figure 4-5. Fungibility Score Table
2) CW-SFGI Split
Using an LP formulation, a solver was used to recommend an optimum SFGI-CW Split to align
with ASRS Allocation. Currently SFGI-CW Split settings is set based on either a 3 or 7 DOI
(current business process preferences for the algorithm) at SFGI. The Proposed SFGI-CW
determination is based on optimizing the total available SFGI space using the same relative
allocation rank calculated for ASRS allocation. The staging decision is based on philosophy that if
you can relatively value/rank inventory, you can stage it appropriately. The more valuable a product,
then in the absence of concrete demand, the more it should be conserved i.e. less risk should be
taken with it in terms of finishing it and moving it from SFGI to CW. Valuable in our context
means it can derive more value from SDD i.e. more profitable, higher demand volume, more
fungible and more variable.
Solver constraints can be setup as follows :
1) ASRS relative allocation can be used as a relative rank value metric such that it adds up to 100
2)The value of 1 DOI for each Product is also used to convert DOI results from Solver to a unit
value with total units constrained by ASRS Capacity
3) The number of DOI (in SFGI) is constrained to be less than 7 for now
4) Product Family Inventory values are obtained by multiplying relative value metric & solver DOI
optimizing to get maximum total inventory value
LP Formulation-
Objective Function: Maximize total inventory value = sum of product family inventory values
Decision Variables: DOI
Constraints-
1) 0 < DOI <7
2) DOI = integer variable
3) sum of units in SFGI 5 Maximum SFGI Capacity (fixed per ATM).[units=DOI x value(1 DOI)].
Solver results for an example optimization solution for a given ATM site is shown below:
SFGI-CW SPLIT SOLVER
Inv. Value
ATNM Site 1 ASRS Value DOI 1DOI units =DOIx Val.
ProductFamily 1 24% 24 7 10,000 70000 168
ProductFamily 2 2% 2 1 15000 15000 2
ProductFamily 3 31% 31 7 12000 84000 217
ProductFamily 4 1% 1 1 13000 13000 1
ProductFamily 5 0% 0 0 14000 0 0
ProductFamily 6 10% 10 7 15000 105000 70
ProductFamily 7 16% 16 7 18000 126000 112
ProductFamily 8 2% 2 0 19000 0 0
ProductFamily 9 10% 10 7 20000 140000 70
ProductFamily 10 3% 3 7 13000 91000 21
TOTAL 99% 99 644000 661
Max Max
DOI= 7 Capacity= 645000
Figure 4-6. SFGI-CW Inventory Split Solver
3) Pro-active L1 swap algorithm
Current L1 Swaps are typically triggered only when customers request a change (COR) or a negative
Left to Book or Available to Commit signal (LTB/ATC) necessitates it.
This typically does not take into account -
1) An Excess Inventory Report stating we should not be building certain L1's
2) A Qx Bubble with potential to hit ASRS Capacity Limit triggering a Flush in the near future
One could potentially look at ASRS Capacity Limit as well as SFGI DOI target and do -
i) Use Excess Inventory Report: Prevent L1 build on Ll's listed in Excess Inventory report in
addition to stopping L1 build in IFG while triggering same week swap request to another L1
ii) Potential Li Flushes due to Qx (SFGI) bubble: SFGI Delayed Differentiation will hold inventory
in SFGI instead of closing to CW, leading to larger deltas between what was planned and what was
executed or finished to CW. These are treated as misses in the ATM build schedule. Delta (Miss) is
rolled into the current weeks ATM Build (Qx) Schedule using the formula
New schedule = Old schedule + Delta from prior week. If SDD keeps avoiding the Finish of a
product because there is no demand on it and if the OFG has a build target for it every week , then
unneeded inventory piles up in SFGI leading to a bubble of inventory. This can be addressed with a
weekly remix by triggering automatic L1 Swap Request, signaling the need to change IFG Request
In both cases we can use either relative ranking within L3 family for decision or use recent SDD
builds as indicator. The advantages of this approach would be -
1) Immediate and automatic swap triggering to reduce excess inventory instead of waiting for next
IFG cycle or CORS request
2) Reduces and smooth's out Qx bubbles based on relative ranking i.e. optimizes risk decision to
take risk on least "valuable product" instead of randomly taking a risk.
3) Dynamically optimizes SDD settings to reduce flushing so on average more products get SDD
Proposed Algorithm for Demand Swap
Deciding the Swap Status for a sku
Swap Status = 114 (BL - Qx schedule - Next week Pull-in) where,
Pull-in = Positive if Next wk builds were pulled-in to current week,
= Negative if lagging behind last week plan.
BL = Customer Order Backlog.
Qx Schedule = ATM Build Schedule as planned by OFG-IFG.
If,
Swap Status = Positive, then Build as per Schedule. Additionally Swaps to this L1 might be needed,
= Negative, then Swap from this L1.
Methodology for Ordering Sku's
Rank Swap status for all Ll's in each ATM site.
Swaps should be made from Negative Ll's (& Excess WOI Ll's).
Swaps should be made to Positive Ll's.
Keeping L1 mappings to multiple L3's in mind, highlight potential swaps.
A possible LP formulation for this problem is given below. The variables used are as follows -
1) The L3 level semi-finished inventory item at SFGI at time step t is I,t and after optimization at
time step (t+1) is Ij(t+l)
2) The L1 level finished inventory item at CW at time step t is Ii, and after optimization at time step
(t+1) is Ii(t+l)
3) Demand in units from CW at time of optimization is Di, and the fractional portion of demand
actually met, again in units, is Ei,
4) For a given L3 level item j there are many different L1 level items I that can be made out of it.
The actual quantity of a particular L1 level item I that we have decided to make from a particular L3
level item j is denoted by the quantity Iit
5) For a particular L1 level item or sku I, Pi denotes the price or profit on it
6) Ci and Cj are weighting factors or "costs" assigned to the finished L1 level item I in CW or semi-
finished item j in SFGI respectively. These can be adjusted based on a combined rank factoring
variance and Fungibility such that given a choice of many L3's from which an L1 can be made, high
variance, high Fungibility, items sit in SFGI and low Fungibility, low variance items get finished and
put in CW.
7) X, is a penalty factor that we can design to weigh certain sku shortages more heavier than other
shortages. So in a situation where not all the L1 level demand can be met from the L3 's sitting in
SFGI, finishing of certain sku's will be preferred over others. This is to account for the fact that
during times of product transition, i.e. NPI strategic build-ahead's and EOL or other price
transitions, we may want to avoid shortage of certain sku's.
Objective Function Maximize: EPi Dit- iYCii(t+1) - ZCI 'j(t+l) - iZXi (Eit- D3)
Decision Variables; Dit
, Ijit
Constraints:
i) Ii(t+l) it+ iIjit - D it
ii) Ij(t+l) = lit-iXIjit
iii) Dit Eit ( for all i)
iv) ELIi t < Iit
IFG Tie-In
If an L3 has all Positive Ll's then request increased allocation for next IFG cycle
If an L3 has all Negative Ll's then request reduced allocation for next IFG cycle
4.3 Pilot Results
4.3.1 Pilot ATM Results on ASRS allocation
i) ATM Re-Allocation Results-
The tables below show the results of using the allocation algorithm and differences between the
current percentage allocation and the new allocation of scarce ASRS capacity across product
families. The first column gives a percentage allocation solely based on revenue (price x volume).
The next 2 columns give the calculated variance and Fungibility ranking. Multiplying these 3
columns gives a overall score next. Normalizing this gives the Allocation ranking in the next
column. However this is unconstrained by Finish tool capacity constraints for individual product
families. A 1 or 0 in the next column indicates which products have or don't have Finish constraints.
The next column then gives a normalized but Final Finish constrained relative allocation for
products. The next column gives the current allocation before pilot for comparison. The next two
columns give the volumes these allocations translate into. The various site results and the
conclusions are given for each site below
a) ATM Site 1:
Figure 4-7. Results for ATM Site 1
ASR S New
Relative Unconstrained Constrained Current Allocated Currently
Revenue Vriance Fungibility Overalt Allocation Allocation Allocation Constrained Allocated
ATM Site I Percentages Rank Rank Score Percentages Constraint Perc
Product
Family 1 24% 2 4.68 1.44 21.05% 1
Product
Family 2 2% 2 0.1 0.04 0.58% 0
Product
Family 3 31% 3 4.66 2.79 40.79% 1
Product
Family 4 1% 1 2.63 0.02 0.29% 1
Product
Family 5 0% 1 0.1 0 0.00% 1
Product
Family 6 10% 3 3.83 0.6 8.77% 1
Product
Family 7 16% 3 6.2 1.44 21.05% 1
Product
Family 8 2% 2 3 0.08 1.17% 0
Product
Family 9 10% 2 2.2 0.4 5.85% 0
Product
Family 10 3% 1 0.1 0.03 0.44% 0
TOTAL 97% 6.84 100.00%
Note:
* Algorithm suggests increased allocation of 93k for Product Family 1.
* 110k new capacity has been added to Family 1 reducing gap to suggested allocation.
* Algorithm suggests significant reduction in Product Family 6 allocation of 246K to 39k.
* Significant excess capacity and under-utilization confirmed and being reduced currently.
* Algorithm suggests higher allocation to Product Family 7 instead of Product family 6.
* This rebalance is currently being looked at.
* Algorithm suggests 17% of Total affected by Finish Constraints. Family 9 should be looked at.
* This is currently is being looked at.
b) ATM Site 2
Product Family 1 0% 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 2 18% 3 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 3 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 4 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 5 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 6 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 7 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family 8 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family9 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family10 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Familyll 0% 1 0 0 0.00%
Product Family12 4% 1 2 0 0.00%
Product Family13 6% 1 2 0 0%
Product Familyl4 33% 2 3 1.98 56%
Product Familyl5 0% 1 0 0 0%
Product Familyl6 0% 1 0 0 0%
Product Familyl7 39% 2 2 1.56 44%
TOTAL 100% 3.54 100%
Figure 4-8. Results for ATM Site 2.
Note:
* Algorithm suggests Site 2 Finish constrained allocation is approximately in line with optimum.
* Corrections from 64 to 56% for Family 14 and 33 to 44% for Family 17 being studied.
* Algorithm points out issues with Family 2 architecture and suggests Design for SDD approach.
* Algorithm suggests 10% of allocation affected by Finish constraints for Families 12 and 13.
c) ATM SITE 3
Product
Family 1 56% 3 1 1.68
Product
Family 2 19% 1 1 0.19
Product
Family 3 17% 3 3 1.53
Product
Family 4
100%
0.16
47%
5%
4%
3.56 100%
Figure 4-9. Results for ATM site 3
Note: Algorithm suggests Optimum allocation for newer implementation in Site 3.
d) ATM Site 4
Product
Family 1 39% 2 2 1.56
Product
Family 2
Product
Family 3
41%
21%
2 2.46
3 0.63
TOTAL 101% 4.65
Figure 4-10. Results for ATM site 4.
es
34%
53%
100%
Note:
Algorithm suggests financial rationale for increased allocation to Product Families 1 and 2.
Need for this increased allocation was agreed on; awaiting resolution of ATM logistics.
ii) Using the Algorithm for Installing New ASRS capacity-
The algorithm was used to guide the decision on where to install newly available ASRS capacity. To
do that a normalized revenue affected by SDD for each additional 32k of capacity (the lowest
granularity for installing capacity) was calculated and is shown below. What the analysis suggested
was that per unit capacity the best site to capture additional revenue for postponement was Site 2 or
site 1. This confirmed existing intuition about which site would have been most beneficial.
Figure 4-11. New ASRS Capacity Payoffs by Site
.... ..................  i i  i
itei 1 8.2 i
Site 2
Site 3
Site 4
10.6M
6.6M
5.OM
iii) Using the Algorithm to Make Different Tradeoffs while Stocking:
The two tables below show a disguised hypothetical example of one amongst many possible
tradeoffs that were looked at with the algorithm. In the tradeoff shown below, once both the New
DOI policy and the allocation percentage are decided, we get-
i) A 2.2x increase in the Relative allocation Rank Value of goods affected by the postponement
strategy which factors in Price, Volume, Fungibility and Variance.
ii) Since the above increase has too many factors, if we just look at the increase in product revenue
affected by postponement strategy it comes to about 1.3x.
iii) Similarly if the aim is to have the most fungible mix in the SFGI the allocation can be checked
either as change in fungible volume at SFGI (1.28x here) or in fungible revenue (0.98x here).
iv) Similar to the metrics for Fungibility the change can be evaluated on the basis of variance
weighted volume(1.47x increase) or variance weighted revenue at SFGI (1.39x here).
The above type of analysis can then be used to evaluate and tweak the decisions being made.
Figure 4-12. SDD Algorithm ROI
ASRSROI
Old Inv. New Inv.
ATM Site I
Product Family 1
Product Family 2
Product Family 3
Product Family 4
Product Family 5
Product Family 6
Product Family 7
Product Family 8
Product Family 9
Product Family 10
TOTAL
Rankng Old24 DO
24
231
31
1
0
10
16
2
10
3
New DO1
7
1
7
1
0
7
7
0
7
7
1DOI Old Units
10000
15000
12000
13000
14000
15000
18000
19000
20000
13000
30000
45000
36000
39000
42000
45000
54000
57000
60000
39000
New units Value Value
70000 72
15000 6
84000 93
13000 3
0 0
105000 30
126000 48
0 6
140000 30
91000 9
644000 644000 297
2.2x
Price ($) Old Rev($) New Rev($)
642
1936
118
527
159
45
114
409
1419
415
19260000
87120000
4248000
20553000
6678000
2025000
6156000
23313000
85140000
16185000
44940000
29040000
9912000
6851000
0
4725000
14364000
0
198660000
37765000
270678000 346257000
1.3x
ASRSROI
ATMSite 1 OldUnits units Price($) y score volume volume revenue Revenue e score weighted Vol Vol Rev Rev
Product Family 1 30000 70000 642 1 30000 70000 19260000 44940000 2 60000 140000 38520000 89880000
Product Family 2 45000 15000 1936 2 90000 30000 174240000 58080000 1 45000 15000 87120000 29040000
ProductFamily 3 36000 84000 118 3 108000 252000 12744000 29736000 2 72000 168000 8496000 19824000
ProductFamily 4 39000 13000 527 3 117000 39000 61659000 20553000 3 117000 39000 61659000 20553000
Product Family 5 42000 0 159 1 42000 0 6678000 0 1 42000 0 6678000 0
ProductFamily 6 45000 105000 45 2 90000 210000 4050000 9450000 3 135000 315000 6075000 14175000
ProductFamily 7 54000 126000 114 1 54000 126000 6156000 14364000 1 54000 126000 6156000 14364000
Product Family 8 57000 0 409 2 114000 0 46626000 0 2 114000 0 46626000 0
ProductFamily 9 60000 140000 1419 1 60000 140000 85140000 198660000 2 120000 280000 170280000 397320000
Product Family 10 39000 91000 415 1 39000 91000 16185000 37765000 1 39000 91000 16185000 37765000
TOTAL 644000 644000 744000 958000 432738000 413548000 798000 1174000 447795000 622921000
1.28x 0.98x 1.47x 1.39x
In the actual pilot efforts were made to increase the relative allocation rank within the system
constraints. This resulted in a forecast for increase in product revenue affected by SDD for 2 of the
sites and a decrease for one of the sites while a fourth site had a new allocation. Overall the revenue
affected by postponement strategy went up by 10% without any capital outlay for increase in
capacity. If only the two sites that had an increase were implemented and the third site had been
kept as is, the increase would have been much larger at 32%. In fact the largest increase was about
6 8%.
4.3.2 ROI calculation for L1 swap
The L1 swap idea was discussed and will be considered for a future project once higher priority
ongoing projects are implemented by the IT team. As such, the rough calculations below are based
on certain conservative assumptions to get a sense for the yearly returns on implementing a L1 swap
scheme. Note that the actual implementation is a simple IT project that would not cost much. The
bigger issue is getting the commitment from hundreds of planners to spend a few minutes daily
looking at L1 swap suggestions and doing regular house-keeping as regards inventory.
A) General Pre-Calculation:
% of ATM revenue on SDD = 30%
Total CPU revenue through ATMs = $30 B
Total SDD revenue = 30B x 30% = $10B
% of Flushes due to space = 10% = $ 1B
% of Flushes that could be avoided with proper ASRS allocation and SFGI-CW split setting and
which result in Qx bubbles = 5% = $50M
% of Qx Bubbles eligible for L1 reallocation given L1 Fungibility within L3 level = 5% = $ 2.5M
B) ROI Components for L1 Swap:
ROI = (1) Savings from Avoiding Inventory Reserve Charges + (2) Savings through Inventory Shelf
Life Reduction + (3) Profit from meeting perishable unmet demand
ROI Component (1): Prevention of Avoidable Inventory Reserve Charges
% of reallocated Ll's that would otherwise have required an inventory reserve charge = 10%
Inventory Reserve charge saved = 10% x 2.5M = 250k$
ROI Component (2): Savings through Inventory Shelf Life Reduction
Average shelf life for remaining 90% Ll's had they not been swapped from unneeded Ll's = 6
weeks (since SDD looks out min of 4 weeks)
Average shelf life of swapped Ll's = 2 weeks (typical)
Average shelf life saved = 4 weeks on 90% of 2.5M= 4 weeks of cost of capital (-24%) of 2.25M -
(1/12)x(24)-2% of 2250k -45k$+5K holding cost= 50K$
ROI Component (3): Profit from meeting perishable unmet demand
Average time that unmet demand is met earlier due to L1 swap = 2 weeks (time gap between 2
OFG-IFG cycles assuming 2x/month)
Unmet demand met = same as Amount of reallocated L1 swaps = 2.5M $
% of unmet demand that is perishable in 2 weeks = 10% = S250K
Total Yearly ROI for L1 swat, = 250K +50K +250K = $ 550K
5. Goals, Incentives and Organizational Behavior
5.1 Human Factors in Supply Chain Management:
The goal of this thesis was in improving Intel's supply chain responsiveness to changing customer
needs especially in the area of fulfilling demand changes for products. Managing a global supply
chain is as much if not more about managing human behavior as it is about managing processes and
supply-demand of products. So managing the communication between individuals in involved
planning organizations, identifying the processes for clearly dealing with areas of shared
responsibility such as with inventory, and aligning incentives with desired behavior for coordination
is a key function of managing the global supply chain.
The supply chain performs as its participants do. They in turn behave as they are rewarded or
punished. What is rewarded, which mistakes receive minor reprimands and which are severely
punished affect people's behavior and so the behavior of the chain. For example doing hot demand
swaps based on early trends may be right most of the time, but if there are no rewards for being
right most of the time and punishment for being wrong a few times then people behave
conservatively. The system of incentives needs to be looked at very carefully, since it is a statement
of what the organization implicitly values. No amount of analysis will be useful if a perverse set of
incentives exist.
The business dynamics facing external participants such as consumers cause similar behavioral
change. While customers are currently asked to estimate their demand a quarter ahead the reality is
that they don't know any more than Intel what the end market will do. Given the zero penalty
cancellation policy they make projections for supply assurance with frequent updates almost till the
last minute as demand firms up. However given the long lead time and the rigidity of the demand
projection and production planning process responding to this is difficult. While the preceding
chapters have explored technical solutions to these issues, the goal of this chapter is to explore
strategic, political and cultural issues related to factoring incentives, organizational design and human
behavior in crafting the right solution.
5.2 STRUCTURAL ISSUES:
Organizational Structure and Strategic Challenges
The strategy of the Microprocessor Marketing and Business Planning- Supply Demand
organization is to coordinate the operations to meet current year business goals e.g. market share
objectives, profit and revenue targets etc. Though the MMBP organization has responsibility for
meeting quarterly financial commitments to Wall Street through operational levers, it must rely on
other organizations for doing this which creates difficulties. Geographic Sales Organizations own
meeting sales targets. To do so factories have been asked to respond to requests from various sales
organizations. This means that Geographic Sales Offices have control over inventory produced and
the mix of products affected. This despite the fact that MMBP is held responsible for excess
inventory hits to the bottom line. Similarly MMBP spends most of its time with customers and
Geographies to create a composite view of demand. However it must rely on the Divisional
Planning organization to implement its policies. The planning organization however uses different
operational definitions for purposes of communicating marketing demands specified at marketing
product family levels to factory level languages based on processing nuances. This creates significant
time lag in translating any plan change from demand language to supply language quickly.
Role related Challenges:
The various roles involved in implementing operational directives influence the current project.
Product Managers set objectives at marketing levels and try to balance the risk of over producing
with the risk of being unable to meet customer demand at an Intel world-wide level. They may not
realize, however, what is misinterpreted along the supply chain as it tries to respond to the targets
they set. The Divisional Planners who try to translate from marketing level demand language to
factory level supply language sometimes may not have access to profit margins per product. Lastly
Geographic Sales is heavily focused on wringing out every last dollar of sales in its geography
without having visibility into how their actions to secure supply for potential sales affect other
geographies worldwide or inventory risks at the Intel level. Work is needed to interface with and
coordinate across all 3 roles. While some coordinating systems are in place through emails/weekly
meetings, etc. making this more agile is what the current project is all about.
Suggested Structural Changes:
Structural and Co-ordination Related Changes
1) Since so much of the decision making is disaggregated, a "wisdom of the crowds" approach to
alignment is advocated. The focus throughout the project has been on utilizing collective
judgment by making available intelligence in MMBP easily accessible and visible across
organizations.
2) Standardizing measurements and interpretations will aid in speaking the same language. To this
end, collaborating across functions such as with the Supply Transformation Team's inventory
metric standardization effort will be important.
3) Educating individual stakeholders on how other organizations function and use their inputs will
help in responding to tactical updates quickly
Role Related Changes:
1) MMBP Demand-Supply Analysts as also Product Managers are focused on getting the more
strategic wafer starts number right at a marketing family level and also at a monthly and
Quarterly granularity. There needs to be a new role to coordinate the tactical supply demand
response across the supply chain. A new role is suggested for this.
5.3 CULTURAL ISSUES:
Symbolism:
Any communication coming from a corporate organization symbolizes control to various other
organizations. Also as a result of this, the demand report published by MMBP called "Judged
Demand" connotes command and control to some in the sense of judging customer inputs. There is
a lot of aggregated world-wide intelligence in this. When different organizations use other demand
signals instead of MMBP inputs, they lose some of this intelligence regarding things such as Price
changes, Branding changes etc. This project, by purporting to affect change by making intelligence
visible to the myriad decision makers, tries to use this distributed experience base. Care has to be
taken to assure people that the goal is to aid them in their decision making instead of trying to make
their decision for them with an algorithm. New initiatives have to be introduced to other
organizations as such. In that sense just the fact that MMBP is reaching out to understand what
these other organizations are doing will be greatly appreciated. Trying to make existing processes
better rather than advocating a completely new process is always preferable. In this sense these other
groups are supportive of like-minded MMBP efforts.
Biases
Given the rich engineering history of Intel, there is a strong reliance on quantitative approaches.
While this is normally good, it does manifest itself sometimes in deleterious ways, as with a lack of
ease in using qualitative intelligence. Sometimes this leads to an over-emphasis on quantitative
approaches at the expense of non-quantifiable softer issues. These can only be attacked by increased
efforts to gather human intelligence. An example maybe an under-exploitation of frequent meetings
at the planning and operational level with VMI Hub customers to understand customer ordering
psychology and behavior and the use of such intelligence in planning strategies. There is also a
danger of being underprepared for rarer events which maybe more common than expected due to
increased uncertainty in times of structural changes in the industry. These can't be predicted with
trend analysis but might be hinted at by gathered human intelligence. Supply chain responsiveness
might be hampered by the preference for choosing the certainty of a fixed plan to the ambiguity of a
flexible plan. From an organizational perspective there is also the danger of a bias towards searching
for solutions in improving quantitative metrics and levers. An example of this might be a preference
for changing pricing to stimulate demand while under-utilizing marketing.
There is something to learn from warnings given to numbers-driven professionals (Walsh 2008).
Keynes once said it is better to be vaguely right instead of precisely wrong while warning economists
against "specious precision" at the expense of "concealed factors" not capable of quantification. He
specifically warned against dismissing qualitative elements as unworthy of analysis, while remarking
that when statistics don't make sense he preferred sense to statistics. Hayek, another titan in the field
of economics, warned classical economists in his Nobel Prize lecture, against laboring under a
"scientistic" attitude, disregarding those factors that cannot be confirmed by quantitative evidence
while happily proceeding on the fiction that the factors they measure are the only relevant ones. An
attribution to Einstein provides the final thought on this topic who suggested that not everything
that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts.
Cultural Levers:
Reaching out to other organizations helps address some of the symbolism of corporate planning
being in its own ivory tower pushing decisions down the chain. In addition, since the "judged"
terminology is a sensitive term, any updates should be packaged as "available intelligence". To
address the concerns over centralized control points, changes have to be made widely visible to
various decision-making organizations in the form they currently use to ease adoption. Another
cultural lever is the use of taskforces. Being part of a cross-functional taskforce and using it to
achieve long term success on goals aligned with its charter can be a key tool in securing buy-in from
various organizations provided a voice by such efforts.
5.4 POLITICAL ISSUES:
Stakeholder Analysis:
MMBP is highly supportive of product prioritization efforts but has a key concern on the extent to
which price information is shared. This has been addressed for this project by sharing a ranking
based on price rather than price itself. As also sharing the published price rather than price with all
the discounts included is preferable for confidentiality reasons. Similarly Division Planning and SDD
have been supportive of initiatives where they don't have any current ones themselves such as ASRS
space allocation and are open to an algorithm based suggestion on other initiatives. Their chief
concern is making it easy to use and maintain without sacrificing accuracy. To take this into account,
the project uses a number of approaches such as simplified product family groupings within the
algorithms.
Alignment:
The various groups in the Intel supply chain are compatible. However the focus of some groups
which are more mathematically oriented is to develop complex highly accurate and optimized
algorithms. The end users typically want it to be simple and just good enough to serve the purpose
while requiring the least amount of work. The end users can simply bypass complex algorithms or
worse yet work at odds with it. Hence this is the group that ends up influencing the implementation
the most. All groups are aware of this and are amenable to this focus on simplicity.
In the case of having to share sensitive price data to base certain ranking decisions, limiting the
groups having this access and making a relative ranking based on price more widely available are
much more realistic and also more acceptable to MMBP.
While there is no conflict between groups, the bigger danger is organizational inertia and making
sure somebody adopts and keeps responsiveness initiatives going after a project. To address this,
tactical problems that serve the larger strategic goal are chosen in this project and addressed first to
develop momentum. Also simplicity and ease of use is emphasized at every point. Finally work is
directed based on continuous real-time, end-user feedback since these are the users that will need to
continue this initiative after a particular project is completed. Most change agents are experienced
enough to know that initiating end user acceptance is the biggest step. Once this is done, continuous
improvement can always be carried out to improve algorithms. As a result the focus of this project
has been on simplicity as a key imperative to achieve strategic goals.
Incentives:
A last key political issue is incentives. Geographies have a big incentive for every additional dollar of
sales they can achieve in their geography, but they have less of the risk of excess inventory. They
also are penalized more heavily for missing projected customer demand than for producing
unnecessary inventory, while they attempt to adapt to changing customer demand. However there is
recognition of these incongruence's in incentives and there is a key task force working on aligning
these incentives. In the meantime, the focus of the internship was to make intelligence visible to
make excess inventory visible for proper decision making.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
In looking at the supply chain and looking at ways of improving the real -time responsiveness or
ability to make precision adjustments to production, the thesis provides both general
recommendations related to Intel and specific ones related to organizations such as MMBP and
Division Planning. MMBP recommendations were primarily related to tracking processes in pricing
and supply-demand and suggestions on the product supply manager role. In the case of Division
Planning they were related to the interactions of SDD with VMI hubs as well as various production
planning processes. Lastly there were suggestions for both specific tools and projects that would
help in making the supply chain more agile.
6.1 General Recommendations
1. Simplification and Housekeeping
Over the years, in order to price-differentiate, there has been a proliferation of sku's. While this can
help capture value from discerning customers or be price competitive, there is also a supply chain
cost associated with supporting each new sku. Similarly there has been a substantial increase in the
number of price and product transitions. Quantifying this cost and simplifying the sku offering is
key. Tracking and reducing unneeded Price/Product Transitions which also add supply chain
complexity goes hand in hand with this as well.
Killing off unneeded sku's and product-price transitions on a regular basis is a housekeeping task
worth institutionalizing. Having a review board (set up by product groups or vertical business
segments and facilitated by MMBP) rather than one-off taskforces is recommended to both approve
and delete sku's.
Another area for simplification is the way upside requests are granted. Instead of a weekly meeting,
having a up to date list of products available for upside request grants, will help with expediting
these kinds of customer change request reviews.
2. Visibility
Price based guidance is the most important piece of information MMBP could share with the Supply
Chain. If confidential information is a concern, then a relative ranking for sku's based on price or
profit margin without the underlying price information would be equally useful if shared with
Division Planning and the factory network. Large differences in demand signals such as JD,
commits and backlog are another area for improved visibility. If MMBP can share the explanation
for this with Division Planning and ATM's then it's easier for them to be consistent with MMBP
strategy.
The area of Product and Price Transitions i.e. both on and off roadmap product EOL, NPI and
price/branding moves is a key area for improvement. Currently price moves, inventory strategies
and supply chain knowledge on planned or unplanned roadmap changes is very limited. This can
result in examples for instance where a decrease in price to flush inventory is seen by planners
downstream as increased demand who build more inventory based on the surge in demand.
Visibility is the best antidote for this, not just to division planners but also between pricing and
supply-demand teams
Providing the entire supply chain visibility on trends is also desirable. Similar to central banks
communicating a forward looking bias when they make interest rate changes, MMBP and Division
Planning should focus not just on communicating the current demand and inventory requirement,
but also whether they expect significant changes(steep declines or increases) or not to ATM's and
FSM's. The outlook bias can be at a product family level with tightening or expanding bias etc. An
example might be in solvers where additional capacity is allocated towards target inventory on
products without much differentiation. Or during the initial phases of an economic slowdown, when
numbers do not reflect anticipated activity reduction, additional precaution might be advised thru
tighter control with precise determination of inventory.
3. Organization
While MMBP currently has a Supply lead position, they are typically busy with the work of managing
the monthly Reset process for Fab Wafer starts typically. Hence creating a new Position in charge of
tracking and improving Tactical performance i.e. daily signals, interaction and handoffs with
Geographies and Division Planning, would help immensely.
Additionally, clarifying the roles and responsibilities for decision making on demand and inventory
positions across organizations would streamline decision making and eliminate redundancy.
Decision making should be devolved to the level where the most intelligence and hands-on
experience resides about the operation in question. In addition to JD for wafer starts, only the things
that need coordination should be addressed at the MMBP level, and an effort should be made to
minimize this, allowing MMBP to focus more on product-pricing strategy and process
improvement. Currently the MMBP is deeply involved in tactical operations and has very little time
to focus on the dynamics of coordination, strategy and process improvement through observation.
Strategic planning under the aegis of MMBP should be looking at the system dynamics issues such
as with human behavior, organization and incentive design and feedback loops to improve tactical
agility. Moving to a model where it gives more tasks to Geographies and Division Planning partners,
while supervising them for consistency, process improvements and alignment with strategic
imperatives will be more productive and less duplicative.
External intelligence gathering is also an area where the above change in organizational focus would
help. Current intelligence gathering at Intel focuses much more on analytical trend analysis from
historical data as compared to speaking with the ordering customer real-time. Having more frequent
and institutionalized interaction with customers to understand ordering behavior is highly
recommended, especially given VMI Hubs and the devolution of near term forecasts to Geo's.
Understanding the dynamics of each customer in terms of corporate vs. consumer, variety of
product lines, channel, region etc. and the implications for forecast accuracy is key.
4. Incentives, Measurements and Accountability
Currently due to the nature of how inventory positions eventually get set, Geographies and Division
Planning contribute much more to inventory decisions than MMBP. Since they set the de facto
tactical inventory policy, they should more clearly have metrics and measurements for their
inventory responsibilities including in bonus targets. On the other hand there should also be a
penalty for missing business by being over conservative, so that incentives are balanced on both
sides. Similarly Over-booking and late cancellations, percent unallocated reservations etc. should
factor in employee bonus goals for Geographies and Division Planning. To avoid the risk of driving
them to under-commit and then ask for upsides bonuses for sales versus penalties for cancellations
must be calibrated carefully. Current measurements tilt too heavily on the side of supply assurance.
This should be balanced with measurements on inventory performance. Delineating accountability
in areas of shared objectives such as inventory management is an important area where things can
fall through because of unclear accountability, hand-offs and incentives.
Currently customers do not have an incentive to improve their forecast accuracy if excess inventory
helps garner discounts. Some sort of rebate system to share the savings resulting from accurate
customer forecasts that also factors in the difference in demand volatility between corporate and
retail customer bases, different geographic footprints and so forth must be devised. While it might
be true that customers do not know demand over time any better than Intel does, it is also true that
there is not any incentive to spend more time and commit more resource to improving it since Intel
guarantees them the inventory and service level asked for.VMI hubs were an attempt to get
improved forecast accuracy from customers with Intel paying the bill for forward positioned
inventory with the tacit agreement that customers would have to improve their forecast accuracy.
But to date not much has arguably improved. One way to jump start this might be a set of metrics
for both sides of the chain committed to by senior management on both sides, with weekly review
meetings to gauge progress and understand large deviations from forecasts or service levels.
5. Clearly Defining Quality and Success Metrics for Planning in a stochastic environment-
The profit maximization goal owned by multiple planning organizations has to be disaggregated to
set clear objectives for each part of the chain- MMBP, Division Planning etc. A fine balance has to
be achieved between fostering risk taking and the cost of a stock out. Currently given the capital
intensive nature of the chip business, a very high cost is put on a stock out and almost none on
excess inventory. This is reflected in incentives and penalties. The danger is this focus keeps
changing as the pendulum swings from concern over customer service during booms to those over
excess inventory in slowdowns. Counter cyclical increases in marketing and drops in pricing have to
be carried out to dampen these effects during times of significant flux. Similarly contract
manufacturer agreements might be enabled e.g. with older chipsets to offload peak demand.
6. Knowledge Capture and Continuous Improvement
The average tenure of a planning analyst is very short and by the time they become experts at their
job they tend to move. Knowledge capture in such cases, particularly the softer knowledge acquired
by analysts in the course of doing their job becomes important. Benchmarking consultants might be
a worthwhile exercise for this. Similarly the addition of a field in the planning/pricing databases
asking analysts to provide reasons for over-ruling suggested decisions by optimizer models(e.g. in
OFG-IFG why they chose a certain demand signal over another.) will help both the model learn
unarticulated qualitative knowledge trends which can be captured via data-mining the beliefs of
analysts and planners. Making unsaid belief systems evident in actions but not explicitly stated,
searchable and explainable captures what the essence of an art is, increasingly converting it into a
science while helping ramp new hires in areas with short tenures by spreading best practices.
Working on improving the process for analysis continuously needs to be as high a priority as
improving the analysis. Something akin to the Army After Action Review (AAR) method can be
used for debriefing to capture learning after each planning cycle, each major transition, completion
of product lifecycle, quarterly or yearly etc. (Garvin, March 08) This requires thinking about
* What did we set out to do and what actually happened?
* Why did it happen and what do we do next time?
* What activities do we sustain or keep and which do we discontinue and what do we improve?
7. Extracting the maximum value out of VMI
Another learning area is in the area of customer learning at VMI hubs. Certain authors have
suggested the following factors as key to extracting the maximum value for providing higher service
levels with VMI-
* Developing a clear dual supplier /partner relationship accountability scorecard to facilitate
information sharing and improving forecasting accuracy clarifying two questions- who is
capturing the appropriate information on a routine, timely basis, and who is ultimately
responsible for improvement?
* A single point of responsibility on each side for VMI learning per customer.
* Forming a cross-functional team on both sides responsible for performance management.
* Performing consistent periodic reviews.
In fact a co-sponsored cross-company team or LFM internship for example between Intel and Dell
looking at the leaning out of inventory while improving service level at VMI hubs might be helpful.
8. Improving Forecasting
Intel is continuously working on improving forecasting accuracy. This section suggests some ideas
for this:
* To avoid the danger of group think in forecasting, Intel uses third party and internal reports,
both top down(from macro environment to micro issues) and bottoms up(building up from sku
by sku basis), forecasting for size and mix as well as reconciliation between geographies.
Similarly measures should be taken for other forecasting biases to prevent peer pressure and
anchoring. Additionally it might be worthwhile to ask Geo's to predict not just their market, but
adjacent markets that they may have insight into, to cross-verify relative assumptions on market
share gains, etc. However any information asymmetries across groups, as regards product-price
transition strategies, need to be leveled.
* Adding continuously updated product lifecycle forecasts might help sanity check whether
inception-to-date projections are consistent with the lifetime projected revenue of a product as
well as historical lifetime revenue. The non-linear complexities associated with diffusion curves
can be used to compare s-curves and inflection points to against part performance.
* A type of scenario analysis that could be added both for forecasting accuracy as well as for
responsiveness is an business-cycle inflection-point metric, benchmarking past trends during
periods of sharp changes in customer or market behavior e.g. 2001 tech correction, 2008
recession crash etc. Associated metrics could be used for risk management.
* Since forecasts tend to extrapolate the immediate present into the immediate future, a sensitivity
analysis should be carried out for strategic assumptions such as how fast a product transition will
happen, how a price cut will stimulate demand, demand distribution across price tiers, market
trends such as from laptop to netbook or discrete to embedded processors, etc. Special attention
should be paid to severe risks with small probabilities e.g. financial meltdown, earthquake in
Taiwan, etc.
6.2 Specific Recommendations
A. Recommendations on Tracking and Transitions
1. Pricing
MMBP Pricing Team should track regularly the number of price transitions (average per sku and
total) a quarter, as well as metrics such as the mean time between transitions for an average sku.
Trends in this can be correlated with supply chain costs. Each price move causes a bull-whip effect
on the supply chain planning systems. If there is an upward trend in number of transitions per sku
or total number of transitions per quarter adjusted for number of sku's, then this might signify
increased market fragmentation or added competitive pressures. Either way this only increases the
pressure for a more responsive supply chain as well as tighter integration between pricing and the
entire supply chain planning team. Currently the pricing team coordinates with MMBP supply-
demand teams, but, given the frequent tactical pressure increasing price moves put on planning,
division planning, ATM's and SDD also need to be more tightly integrated with pricing teams. This
could be a separate role in Pricing or MMBP Supply. Eventually a better IT system and more
visibility across the chain on price changes and their anticipated demand effects on skus is needed,
so that it can be tied tactically to processes like SDD, ATM pull-ins, ATM Range Planning etc.
2. Supply-Demand
The MMBP Supply Demand team should track Supply commitments like allocations in DSS
(Decision Support Systems) as tactical demand signals. This is because that is how the rest of the
supply chain views as their true demand signal for planning purposes. Product transitions such as
number of instances where a product crosses PSLV type segment boundaries, the number of
instances where a product drops to bottom rung of price ladder, and, especially, the number of
instances of products that disappear from a roadmap per quarter should be tracked. I.T. capabilities
to track end to end inventory position daily or demand and inventory build signals through all the
production planning processes should be built up. This will help make OFG-IFG and post SDD
results visible to product planners and managers.
3. Managing Transitions
Given the especially disruptive nature of transitions it is worth thinking what else can be done about
them. One possibility is to apply the Lean principle of Heijunka - leveling fluctuations in demand by
staging price and product transitions on a family basis using a strategy similar to Intel's famed tick-
tock strategy.
Inventory targets need to follow the product life cycle going up for NPI and automatically ramping
down as EOL approaches. Service levels for different products should be based not just on lifecycle
- NPI/EOL but also metrics such as high volume, high profit contribution, high margin, highly
variable, strategic build ahead, etc. Service levels at all inventory locations (CW, VMI etc.) should
thus be time phased, financially differentiated and lifecycle dependent. Also certain business
processes should be differently set based on these categorizations etc. shorter frozen horizon for
EOL's etc.
B. Recommendations for Product Supply Managers
Inventory target Setting
Product Supply Managers should look to standardizing inventory target setting methodology across
verticals. Simplicity should be given precedence over complex customization for each vertical. Focus
should be on compliance across the supply chain over theoretical accuracy. To this end targets need
to be set as simply as possible while anticipating the environment in which solvers try to implement
their targets (using a rolling basis for target setting) especially in the areas of minimum and target
inventory numbers. Using current BOH (Beginning On Hand), discontinuing breaking targets down
into ADI and CW targets and focusing on Wafer starts targets i.e. only the ADI target bear special
consideration. In addition, SDD should be factored in target setting since it plays an increasingly
large role in decoupling the ATM production plan (OFG-IFG) from actual CW Finishes.
4. Miscellaneous
PM's should look to tracking metric such as percentage requests answered within a day using more
frequent supply commits, approval meetings, and expedited list of sku's available, for quick upside
request grants, etc. More proactive approaches such as work with Division Planning through SDD
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and ATM Range Planning to convey and make tactical demand updates should also be used more
regularly.
C. Recommendations on approaching SDD-VMI Interactions
Intel has more recently decided to forward stage inventory in VMI (Vendor Managed
Inventory) hubs for its biggest OEM customers. The VMI strategy of forward staging of
significant quantities of next month's projected demand has significant implications for
the delayed customization processes such as SDD. The key impact is that SDD now has to react to
monthly demand projections rather than true customer demand pulls from CW. Thus the strategy
reduces the benefit of SDD which increases inventory target overruns. Ideally this should be
implemented as a replenishment strategy with Intel replenishing the amount taken from VMI
regularly with some intelligence around product transitions like EOL and NPI. However there are
some roadblocks to doing this effectively while still guaranteeing a very high level of service level.
The reasons include the weekly frequency of the SAP SNP solve for VMI replenishment, the
transportation times from CW to VMI hubs, and the lack of tie-ins or micro-feedback loops to
OFG-IFG, SDD and ATM Range Planning. This results in increased reliance on slow, fortnightly
planning processes. This still could be carried out partially for sku's with lower profit contribution,
variance, and higher Fungibility if the concept of financially differentiated sku service levels is
implemented. Certain types of EOL and Non High Volume (or sporadic demand distribution)
runners might also be suitable for this.
Staging Inventory:
For Non-VMI customers, it is preferable to keep more in SFGI and less in CW e.g. 18 DOI in
SFGI & 3 DOI in CW. This increases the Risk-pooling effect. This should be done in addition to
significantly increasing SFGI capacity and reducing Finish capacity constraints. For VMI customers,
assuming build ahead of significant amounts of next month's projected demand, CW inventory must
be reduced substantially, keeping enough only to service the remaining CW Direct & Disti-Box or
Tray customers.
2. SDD Algorithm Settinas:
The SDD settings that determine SFGI-CW inventory splits must add a VMI component.
Additionally during Flush operations, SDD currently looks ahead to the next month of orders to
decide what to make. With VMI, this component should be included in the consideration effectively
increasing the look-ahead period to more than a month
3. VMI:
Given that the idea behind SDD is to delay customization to as late a point in the supply chain as
possible, with the new VMI strategy installing Finish capability in VMI hubs, possibly in addition to
that at SFGI, must be investigated. With significant forward staging of inventory in VMI's, VMI
hubs are effectively the new CW's. As discussed before, if we continue to postpone through SDD
only at SFGI and then introduce VMI, several new issues are created. We have to build ahead
several weeks out dilutes SDD's impact, which now will be Pull based only for a small portion of
volume. Also asking SDD to rely on monthly projections make it less accurate versus reacting to
weekly demand pulls from customers. Finally the additional SNP solve sitting between VMI hubs
and SDD introduces additional judgment and time lag as it is done once a week instead of multiple
times a day. All these reasons point to Finish in VMI as a viable idea to be considered.
D. Recommendations for Production Planning
1. Converting OFG-IFG Planning for ATM's to Pull from Push:
There is a real opportunity to improve ATM Responsiveness, in addition to improving forecasts on
the ATM side, by moving to a pull signal based on replenishment versus a forecast based push signal
as shown in figure below. This will require -
i) Reducing the ATM frozen horizon from 2 week to 1week,
ii) Reducing OFG planning time by half by efforts to streamline the production plan even if it is at
the expense of decreased tool utilization, and removing the need for IFG with only 1 demand signal
plus a very simple inventory signal, and
iii) Replacing the Geo demand Push signal with a Pull signal based on inventory replenishment for
CW +VMI, using better information systems to pull information rapidly versus having to piece it
together.
Figure 6-1. Current Push-Based OFG-IFG Process
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Figure 6-2. Alternate Pull-Based OFG-IFG Process
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2. Inventory Positioning Between CW and VMI:
The profile below shows the current inventory positioning on a relative basis first and the suggested
positioning later. The reason the CW inventory is moved to SFGI is to Finish only what is
necessary. An advantage of this is the risk pooling on unfinished parts rather than finished parts.
However a disadvantage is that the long lead time between CW and VMI makes it less responsive.
An alternative approach to improve responsiveness, while moving to postponement as far as
possible into the chain, is to move SFGI and Finish to the VMI hub shipping semi-finished goods
to VMI hubs. The disadvantage is the risk pooling is now on finished goods at CW. This is showed
in the next set of figures.
Figure 6-3. Current and Suggested Inventory Profile
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Figure 6-4. Alternative SFGI Arrangement to Delay SDD Postponement to VMI
3. ATM Processes in the Frozen Period:
The two key ATM processes for build decisions inside the frozen horizon are SDD and ATM
Range Planning. To make them more useful for demand updates they need to be made more
effective. For SDD, the limitations on ASRS (SFGI Storage Space) space are the key constraint and
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need to be removed by expanding available ASRS space. Dynamic allocation of SDD SFGI
capacity must also be considered to improve ASRS utilization ratios. Scarce ASRS space should be
allocated factoring in profit margins, and not purely on volume as discussed earlier.ATM Range
Planning should be expanded to include affecting mean build signals and recoveries instead of just
providing build ranges. In addition to the above two processes, a new process for dynamically
remixing builds should be considered (L1 swaps) based on Excess Inventory, Aged Demand in Qx
Bubble, SDD Flush Probability.
4. OFG-IFG Solver Optimization :
Currently the OFG-IFG production planning process is run individually by various planners for
other products. This means that products sharing common BOM (Bill of Materials viz. die and
packages) are not optimized globally if minimum planner requirements are met. Globally optimized
runs factoring in Margins should be run post these individual fragmented solves. Additionally, the
IFG process should be run without having to consume total requested capacity in OFG since a lot
can change in a week. . In addition, the process of adjusting demand inputs and flags to meet the
required demand as closely as possible would benefit from a more defined business process to
prevent sub-optimization.
5. Solver Mechanics:
The inventory targets used in solvers have a huge impact. Currently they are set in direct proportion
to volume but they should be set based on revenue (price x volume), variance and Fungibility, not
just volume. In addition to changing the basis for targets, the WOI definition should be
standardized, since there are up to 14 different definitions across the supply chain for each time
horizon which causes immense confusion and misinterpretation. As mentioned earlier OFG-IFG
solvers should have a final global optimizer step to balance inventory build above needed target on
relative ranking basis (incorporating Price, Volume, Fungibility and Variance)
6. Micro Feedback loops & Trend Consistency Checks:
Early warning systems should be built based on short run feedback loops. Current feedback loops
are long and introduce significant delays in learning. The excess inventory flag is a good example of
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this. When the flag is raised, it affects WSPW on a macro scale with its effect on JD, but it needs to
be done on micro scale with ATM OFG-IFG based build plans and Pro-active L1 demand
swapping being affected by CW direct pulls.
So feedback loops should be well nested and interlocked with other planning processes. A
comparison of trends must also be done e.g. increased wafer starts on a particular product while
current OFG-IFG plan or swaps show a decreasing trend may signify an issue such as a demand
pickup of NPI products away from EOL products or product cannibalization.
6.3 Future Work
Future Work for continuing to improve the supply chain responsiveness lies in executing in two key
areas- new tools and new projects.
1. New Tools:
a) A standalone tool to enable quick conversion of different product levels (Sku, MM, L3, Stepping,
L1 etc.) is probably one of the key tools required for improving communication across the chain.
This will help in quick conversion and communication of tactical demand updates down the chain.
Logic exists inside solvers, other division planning tools, e.g. TDF and in supply team spreadsheets.
The tool must be propagated to Division, ATMs, the SDD team, Geographies etc. to enabling
company-wide communication.
b) A tool showing current inventory position across supply chain from target setting to
implementation through build plan, OFG and IFG, SDD, to the resulting inventory positions in CW
would help product supply managers manage the supply chain.
c) A Division and MMBP tool showing products at the L1 level, flagged for Excess Inventory,
potential SDD flushes & bubbles in the ATM build schedule (Qx bubbles), while suggesting
proactive L1 swaps for rebalancing builds, would help immensely.
d) A tool that would help maintain an up-to-date list of products, with enough supply available for
expedited approval of last minute customer upside requests in the change order request (CORs)
database, would help improve customer responsiveness.
e) A key issue for strategists at MMBP is that the implications of their strategy for product
prioritization don't easily get transmitted down the supply chain to the factory network. A relative
product prioritization tool based on MMBP strategy and pricing would help downstream decision
makers, e.g. ATM, SDD etc. make the proper decisions. A web based information distribution
system like the above could also work for single view of discounts for example where different
business units can offer different types of discounts on the same sku and where having one view of
the actual selling price of a sku on an enterprise wide basis may be difficult.
f) A software patch or process for treating placeholder values in the SAP planning system, e.g.
allocation as a safety stock for field sales to prevent adding inventory on this volume, should be
developed.
2. Projects:
There are many other projects that might help with responsiveness. Some of these might be small
enough for internships while others might require the IT department to work on them.
a) Pricing changes are currently done for strategic and competitive response, but not as much to
manage inventory. It should be used to shape demand in line with supply e.g. when excess inventory
flags go up or SDD Qx bubbles start building up, causing increased L1 swapping activity. Vendors
such as Dell which are famous for demand shaping should be bench marked for best practices.
b) Currently SDD isn't modeled in Inventory Target Setting, but it should be, since it is a key push-
pull interface in the supply chain that decouples planned production from customer pulls.
c) The decision on what gets stocked in VMI Hubs is done primarily on volume. But just like the
decision for SDD capacity allocation, this decision should be made on a combination of Revenue
(Volume x Price), Variance, Fungibility etc.
d) Product transitions are notoriously difficult for planning purposes. Making EOL/NPI visible to
the ATM Factory Network would help with production planning.
e) While there has been an effort to quantify the cost of maintaining a new sku, there hasn't been a
similar study done for studying the impact of price or product transition reduction. This would help
tremendously, as there definitely is a big cost to every additional transition in terms of supply chain
inefficiency.
f) The impact of positioning substantially more inventory in semi finished goods instead of finished
goods should be evaluated and implemented if feasible.
g) The possibility of keeping the bulk of consistent volume items on an automatic system instead of
planning for them every month should be evaluated for cost savings and speed during the Reset and
OFG-IFG process.
h) Currently blanket service levels are set for all sku's. Having different service levels for different
customers or sku's based on their strategic value or profit margins etc. should be studied (Raiij 05).
i) Since VMI hubs might reduce the ROI of SDD, this should be modeled along with the ROI of
installing SDD at VMI hubs
j) The impact of architectures such as Atom (which aren't customizable to a large extent at SDD)
and their growing sales should be studied, especially as it relates to Inventory buildups.
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Appendix - Note on theoretically setting service levels to optimize aggregate service
The Semi-Finished Goods Packaged Chip Inventory (SFGI) sits at the input of Finish process and
are said to be at the L3 level. Each product at an L3 level can be mapped to several sku's or L1 level
product (Intel Terminology) or MM level (SAP terminology). This is said to be a highly fungible L3.
Note that each L1 can also be obtained from many L3's. In this sense this is a many to many
mapping. The final mapping or Finish process is done via fusing (blowing a fuse) and down binning,
either from a speed or power perspective.
In a typical case the L3 level volumes sitting in SFGI warehouse, are based on an approximately 2
month old forecast based production plans. The L1 level demand and shortages are based on end
customer demand from the finished goods warehouse post-Finish called CW (component
Warehouse). In this sense the SDD (SFGI delayed differentiation) algorithm that controls the Finish
decision making process represents the Push-Pull interface for the Production process. The issue at
hand is to figure out the best way to make the decision for rebalancing the L1 level finish requests
based on Push-Pull mismatches. This can be done by trying to maximize Revenues (variable costs
i.e. COGS and holding costs being much smaller than price due to high profit margins means
Revenues dictate profits.)
Objective: To distribute L3 level fungible product family across Ll's based on certain criteria. In
other words we are looking to establish weights for a weighted average capacity allocation approach
subject to a fixed inventory capacity budget.
Strategy: This can be done using an approach focusing on maximizing Revenues subject to a fixed
inventory capacity budget using the techniques of non-linear optimization and Lagrangean relaxation
(Fisher, January 81). Let:
IK, = constant for item i representing number of standard deviations of inventory to hold
S = shortage on item i
oi = standard dev of item i during lead time
Vi = volume of item i
Pi - Price of item i
Ri = Relative Ranking of item i
B= Fixed Budget
(A) Theoretical Derivation of Weights:
The Total Revenue is I ViPiF (K)
Where F (IK) is Distribution of demand for item i centered around 0
Such that C Ko i =B (a constant). The latter follows from a normal distribution.
So, using a Lagrangean approach (see Fisher, January 81) let's looks at aggregate service with the
budget variable in the Lagrangean.
H (k) = [Function to be maximized]
H (k) = I ViPiF(Ki)
X= Lagrange Multiplier Constant.
So to get optimality condition is for each item i
Max , ViPiF(K) + k(C IK o)
SMax ViPiF(K1 + k ( ai) for each item i w.r.t. i
dd ViPiF(Ki)
dK +X d Kici 
= 0
dK
assuming F is concave, we get
SViPiF'(K) + oi X 0
F'(I = - (P/(ViP)
Note: 1) ) is typically negative making operand positive.
2) High Volume or Low sigma implies a lower density and hence a larger value for Ki
(B)Heuristic Method to Derive Weights:
1) Get Rank by [(ViP)(Fungibility)]/o i - Rank,
+ X [Zero value of constraint]
+ k (B-I Kici)
k=F-' [- (kc0/(ViPi)-
2) Normalize to get Relative Ranking by calculating (Ranki)/Average Rank = Ri .
3) Calculate average number of sigma's = K = Total Safety Stock divided by sum of sigma's e.g.
K o + K o +...= Total Safety Stock, which is given.
K(oy) = Total Safety Stock
K = (Total Safety Stock)/ (Zo)
4) Determine I. the safety factor for each sku by approximating the non linear function F' -1 (derived
in previous section A theoretically) for simplification, with a linear function f.
From previous section we got theoretical value as IK=F '-' [ - (kr)./( ViP)]
We now approximate I = F' '(x) with I = a+f(x)=a+f(R)=a+f(RI(K)
5) Normalize I again to ensure we meet constraint B by
Is = ( K c) /B to normalize I( to make sure Budget is within limits set by B.
Difference between Theoretical optimum and Heuristic Implementation-
In the heuristic ASRS allocation algorithm described in section 4.2.2, we had
Allocation oc (Profit) (Volume) (Variance) (Fungibility). In the theoretical optimum calculated in this
appendix, we get Allocation (x [(Profit) (Volume)]/ [Variance] . If Fungibility considerations are
added it can be shown that Allocation o [(Profit)(Volume) (Fungibility)]/ [Variance]
Thus eventually we recommend going to a system where we move variance to the denominator.
During the project due to the large numbers of SKU's whose composition is always changing,
several practical issues related to IT systems and data integrity in getting reliable variance numbers a
different simpler heuristic was used. Simplifications were used for variance rankings and the simpler
heuristic approach was used. Eventually once the variance calculations can be quickly and reliably be
turned around, implementation and validation on the suggested theoretical formula might be carried
out.
